Committee decisions: Optimality and Equilibrium
We consider a group or committee that faces a binary decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information. Members agree which decision should be taken in each state of nature, had this been known, but they may attach different values to the two types of mistake that may occur. Most voting rules have a plethora of uninformative equilibria, and informative voting may be incompatible with equilibrium. We analyze an anonymous randomized majority rule that has a unique equilibrium. This equilibrium is strict, votes are informative, and the equilibrium implements the optimal decision with probability one in the limit as the committee size goes to infinity. We show that this also holds for the usual majority rule under certain perturbations of the behavioral assumptions: (i) a slight preference for voting according to one's conviction, and (ii) transparency and a slight preference for esteem. We also show that a slight probability for voting mistakes strengthens the incentive for informative voting.
|Date of creation:||Sep 2008|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00121741/en/|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ |
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eliaz, K., 1999.
"Fault Tolerant Implementation,"
21-99, Tel Aviv.
- Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1988. "Committees, Hierarchies and Polyarchies," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(391), pages 451-70, June.
- McLennan, Andrew, 2011.
"Manipulation in elections with uncertain preferences,"
Journal of Mathematical Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 370-375.
- Andrew McLennan, 2008. "Manipulation in Elections with Uncertain Preferences," Discussion Papers Series 360, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
- Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn, 2008.
"Should the individual voting records of central bankers be published?,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 655-683, May.
- Hahn, Volker & Gersbach, Hans, 2001. "Should the Individual Voting Records of Central Bankers be Published?," Discussion Paper Series 1: Economic Studies 2001,02, Deutsche Bundesbank, Research Centre.
- Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
- Al-Najjar, Nabil I. & Smorodinsky, Rann, 2000. "Pivotal Players and the Characterization of Influence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 318-342, June.
- Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191.
- Bauke Visser & Otto H Swank, 2007. "On Committees of Experts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372, 02.
- Timothy J. Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1995.
"The Swing Voter's Curse,"
1064, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Myerson, Roger B., 1998.
"Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Discussion Papers 1103, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Hahn, Volker, 2008. "Committees, sequential voting and transparency," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 366-385, November.
- Kfir Eliaz, 2002. "Fault Tolerant Implementation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 69(3), pages 589-610.
- Wit, Jorgen, 1998. "Rational Choice and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 364-376, February.
- Job Swank & Otto H. Swank & Bauke Visser, 2008. "How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 478-486, 04-05.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-00121741. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (CCSD)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.