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Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium

Author

Listed:
  • Laslier, Jean-François

    () (École Polytechnique)

  • Weibull, Jörgen

    () (Dept. of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics)

Abstract

We consider a committee facing a binary decision under uncertainty. Each member holds some private information. Members may have different preferences and initial beliefs, but they all agree which decision should be taken in each of the two states of the world. We characterize the optimal anonymous and deterministic voting rule and provide a homogeneity assumption on preferences and beliefs under which sincere voting is a Nash equilibrium for this rule. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for sincere voting to be an equilibrium under any deterministic majoritarian voting rule. We show that a class of slightly randomized majoritarian voting rules make sincere voting a strict and unique pure-strategy equilibrium. A slight deontological preference for sincere voting, or ex post revelation of individual votes – ”transparency” – combined with a concern for esteem, has the same effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Laslier, Jean-François & Weibull, Jörgen, 2008. "Commitee decisions: optimality and equilibrium," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 692, Stockholm School of Economics, revised 11 Mar 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:hastef:0692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2009. "On Bayesian-Nash Equilibria Satisfying the Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case," Discussion Paper Series dp527, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
    3. Bezalel Peleg & Shmuel Zamir, 2008. "Condorcet Jury Theorem: The Dependent Case," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002115, David K. Levine.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    voting; condorcet; committee; jury; judgement aggregation.;

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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