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Deliberation with Partially Verifiable Information

  • Jerome Mathis

    ()

    (THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise)

We analyze a model of jury decision making in which jurors deliberate before voting between a status quo and its alternative. We study the impact of the voting rule on the existence of an equilibrium where any asymmetric decision-relevant information is revealed through deliberation. Austen-Smith and Feddersen (2004b) show in a general setting that the unanimity rule (with status quo) requires stronger conditions than other rules for the existence of such an equilibrium. In this paper, we extend this work by incorporating possibilities for committee members to prove some of their private information (ability to report a certi.ed document, constraint on lying or exaggeration, etc...). We show that when individuals have ability to certify information favoring the alternative, the unanimity rule performs better than other rules in requiring weaker conditions for the existence of such an equilibrium.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2006-03.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-03
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  1. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
  2. Marco Battaglini, 2002. "Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1379-1401, July.
  3. Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 1999. "A Model of Expertise," Working Papers 154, Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Discussion Papers in Economics..
  4. Itzhak Gilboa & Nicolas Vieille, 2004. "Majority vote following a debate," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 115-125, 08.
  5. Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
  6. Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
  7. John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1999. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Working Papers 9904, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
  8. Enriqueta Aragones & Itzhak Gilboa & Andrew Postlewaite & David Schmeidler, 2013. "Rhetoric and Analogies," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 932.13, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
  9. Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts," Discussion Papers 1170, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Austen-Smith David, 1993. "Interested Experts and Policy Advice: Multiple Referrals under Open Rule," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 3-43, January.
  11. Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A., 1997. "Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules," Papers 17-97, Tel Aviv.
  12. Alvin K. Klevorick & Michael Rothschild & Christopher Winship, 1982. "Information Processing and Jury Decisionmaking," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 635, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  13. Ottaviani, Marco & Sorensen, Peter, 2001. "Information aggregation in debate: who should speak first?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(3), pages 393-421, September.
  14. Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
  15. Nicola Persico, 2004. "Committee Design with Endogenous Information," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(1), pages 165-191, 01.
  16. Kiel, Alexandra & Gerling, Kerstin & Schulte, Elisabeth & Grüner, Hans Peter, 2003. "Information acquisition and decision making in committees: a survey," Working Paper Series 0256, European Central Bank.
  17. Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
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