Pandering and electoral competition
We study an election with two perfectly informed candidates. Voters share common values over the policy outcome of the election, but possess arbitrarily little information about which policy is best for them. Voters elect one of the candidates, effectively choosing between the two policies proposed by the candidates. We explore under which conditions candidates always propose the voters' optimal policy. The model is extended to include strategic voting, policy-motivated candidates, imperfectly informed candidates, and heterogeneous preferences.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,"
Economics Working Papers
0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
- Eric Maskin, 2003. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Santiago Oliveros & Felix Vardy, 2013. "Demand for Slant: How Abstention Shapes Voters’ Choice of News Media," Economics Discussion Papers 734, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Lipman Barton L. & Seppi Duane J., 1995. "Robust Inference in Communication Games with Partial Provability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 370-405, August.
- Duggan, John & Martinelli, Cesar, 2001.
"A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 259-294, November.
- John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1998. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Wallis Working Papers WP14, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- John Duggan & Cesar Martinelli, 1999. "A Bayesian Model of Voting in Juries," Working Papers 9904, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1994.
"Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information,"
1117, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(5), pages 1029-1058, September.
- Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1997. "Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1560, David K. Levine.
- Kenneth Shotts, 2006. "A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 251-261, October.
- Callander, Steven & Wilkie, Simon, 2007. "Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 262-286, August.
- Binswanger, J. & Prüfer, J., 2012.
"Democracy, populism, and (un)bounded rationality,"
Other publications TiSEM
6ebfff9d-e076-4d09-90c6-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Vijay Krishna & John Morgan, 2010.
"Overcoming Ideological Bias in Elections,"
NajEcon Working Paper Reviews
- Ronny Razin, 2003. "Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1083-1119, 07.
- Hulya Eraslan & Philip Bond, 2007.
"Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals,"
2007 Meeting Papers
167, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Castanheira, Micael, 2002.
"Why Vote for Losers?,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3404, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bernhardt, Dan & Duggan, John & Squintani, Francesco, 2007.
"Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-29, January.
- John Duggan, 2003. "Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000029, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Martinelli, Cesar, 2006.
"Would rational voters acquire costly information?,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 225-251, July.
- Doraszelski Ulrich & Gerardi Dino & Squintani Francesco, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-41, August.
- David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003.
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1997.
"Large Poisson Games,"
1189, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Meirowitz, Adam & Shotts, Kenneth W., 2009. "Pivots versus signals in elections," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(2), pages 744-771, March.
- Sourav Bhattacharya, 2006.
"Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections,"
325, University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics, revised Dec 2008.
- Sourav Bhattacharya, 2013. "Preference Monotonicity and Information Aggregation in Elections," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(3), pages 1229-1247, 05.
- Harrington, Joseph E, Jr, 1993. "Economic Policy, Economic Performance, and Elections," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 27-42, March.
- Martinelli, Cesar, 2001. " Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 108(1-2), pages 147-67, July.
- Stephen Morris, 2001.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(2), pages 231-265, April.
- Szentes, Balazs & Koriyama, Yukio, 2009. "A resurrection of the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
- Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000.
"Hiding Information in Electoral Competition,"
CIG Working Papers
FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
- Gerardi, Dino & Yariv, Leeat, 2007. "Deliberative voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 134(1), pages 317-338, May.
- Krishna, Vijay & Morgan, John, 2012. "Voluntary voting: Costs and benefits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2083-2123.
- : Christian Schultz, .
"Polarization and Inefficient Policies,"
93-16, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- Kohlberg, Elon & Reny, Philip J., 1997. "Independence on Relative Probability Spaces and Consistent Assessments in Game Trees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 280-313, August.
- Sambuddha Ghosh & Vinayak Tripathi, 2012. "Ideologues Beat Idealists," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 27-49, May.
- Piketty, Thomas, 2000. "Voting as Communicating," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(1), pages 169-91, January.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2004. "Electoral competition under imperfect information," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 24(2), pages 419-446, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:84:y:2014:i:c:p:163-179. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.