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Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections

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  • McMurray, Joseph

Abstract

Adding candidates to a one-dimensional common-interest voting model, this paper shows that catering to centrist voters can lower social welfare. The electoral benefit of doing so is weak, so candidates polarize substantially in equilibrium, resolving a long-standing empirical puzzle.

Suggested Citation

  • McMurray, Joseph, 2022. "Polarization and pandering in common-interest elections," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 133(C), pages 150-161.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:133:y:2022:i:c:p:150-161
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.028
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Polarization; Pandering; Information aggregation; Jury theorem; Median voter; Common interest; Competition; Elections; Ideology; Public opinion; Voting; Epistemic democracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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