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Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning

Author

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  • Schipper, Burkhard C.
  • Woo, Hee Yeul

Abstract

We study the informational effectiveness of electoral campaigns. Voters may not think about all political issues and have incomplete information with regard to political positions of candidates. Nevertheless, we show that if candidates are allowed to microtarget voters with messages then election outcomes are as if voters have full awareness of political issues and complete information about candidates' political positions. Political competition is paramount for overcoming voters' limited awareness of political issues but unnecessary for overcoming just uncertainty about candidates' political positions. Our optimistic results break down if microtargeting is not allowed or voters lack political reasoning abilities. In such cases, negative campaigning comes to rescue, at least in the majoritarian model.

Suggested Citation

  • Schipper, Burkhard C. & Woo, Hee Yeul, 2019. "Political Awareness, Microtargeting of Voters, and Negative Electoral Campaigning," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 14(1), pages 41-88, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00016066
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00016066
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    Cited by:

    1. Boyer, Pierre C. & Konrad, Kai A. & Roberson, Brian, 2017. "Targeted campaign competition, loyal voters, and supermajorities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 49-62.
    2. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 176, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    3. Martin Meier & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2022. "Conditional dominance in games with unawareness," Working Papers 351, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    4. Alejandro Francetich & Burkhard Schipper, 2025. "Rationalizable Screening and Disclosure under Unawareness," Working Papers 374, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    5. Konrad, Kai A., 2020. "Attacking and defending multiple valuable secrets in a big data world," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 280(3), pages 1122-1129.
    6. Ying Xue Li & Burkhard Schipper, 2025. "Disclosure under Unawareness: An Experiment," Working Papers 370, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    7. Burkhard Schipper, 2017. "Kuhn's Theorem for Extensive Games with Unawareness," Working Papers 204, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    8. Li, Ying Xue & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2020. "Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 329-367.
    9. Anja Prummer, 2016. "Spatial Advertisement in Political Campaigns," Working Papers 805, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    10. Ki Vin Foo & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2025. "Kuhn's Theorem for Games of the Extensive Form with Unawareness," Working Papers 369, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    11. Jacopo Bizzotto & Benjamin Solow, 2019. "Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure," Games, MDPI, vol. 10(3), pages 1-17, July.
    12. Eguia, Jon X. & Nicolo, Antonio, 2019. "Information and targeted spending," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(2), May.
    13. Prummer, Anja, 2020. "Micro-targeting and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    14. Schipper, Burkhard C., 2021. "Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 198(C).
    15. Burkhard C. Schipper & Hang Zhou, 2022. "Level-k Thinking in the Extensive Form," Working Papers 352, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    16. Anja Prummer, 2016. "Spatial Advertisement in Political Campaigns," Working Papers 805, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
    17. Gaia Belardinelli & Burkhard C. Schipper, 2023. "Implicit Knowledge in Unawareness Structures," Working Papers 360, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
    18. Heifetz Aviad & Meier Martin & Schipper Burkhard C., 2021. "Prudent Rationalizability in Generalized Extensive-form Games with Unawareness," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 525-556, June.
    19. Satoshi Kasamatsu & Daiki Kishishita, 2022. "Informative campaigning in multidimensional politics: The role of naïve voters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 34(1), pages 78-106, January.

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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