Elections with Privately Informed Parties and Voters
This paper studies a situation in which parties are better informed than voters about the optimal policies for voters. We show that voters are able to infer the parties' information by observing their electoral positions, even if parties have policy preferences which differ substantially from the median voter's. Unlike previous work that reach opposite conclusions, we assume that voters have some private information of their own. If the information available to voters is biased, parties' attempts to influence voters' beliefs will result in less than full convergence even if parties know with certainty the optimal policy for the median voter. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Volume (Year): 108 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (July)
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