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Population uncertainty and Poisson games

Author

Listed:
  • Roger B. Myerson

    () (Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2009, USA)

Abstract

A general class of models is developed for analyzing games with population uncertainty. Within this general class, a special class of Poisson games is defined. It is shown that Poisson games are uniquely characterized by properties of independent actions and environmental equivalence. The general definition of equilibrium for games with population uncertainty is formulated, and it is shown that the equilibria of Poisson games are invariant under payoff-irrelevant type splitting. An example of a large voting game is discussed, to illustrate the advantages of using a Poisson game model for large games.

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:27:y:1998:i:3:p:375-392
    Note: Received December 1995/Revised version July 1997
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Harsanyi, John C, 1995. "Games with Incomplete Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 291-303, June.
    2. Myerson, Roger B., 2000. "Large Poisson Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 7-45, September.
    3. Myerson, Roger B., 1998. "Extended Poisson Games and the Condorcet Jury Theorem," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 111-131, October.
    4. repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:62-78_22 is not listed on IDEAS
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