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(Don’t) Make My Vote Count

  • Faravelli, Marco
  • Sanchez-Pages, Santiago

Proponents of proportional electoral rules often argue that majority rule depresses turnout and may lower welfare due to the 'tyranny of the majority' problem. The present paper studies the impact of electoral rules on turnout and social welfare. We analyze a model of instrumental voting where citizens have private information over their individual cost of voting and over the alternative they prefer. The electoral rule used to select the winning alternative is a combination of majority rule and proportional rule. Results show that the above arguments against majority rule do not hold in this set up. Social welfare and turnout increase with the weight that the electoral rule gives to majority rule when the electorate is expected to be split, and they are independent of the electoral rule employed when the expected size of the minority group tends to zero. However, more proportional rules can increase turnout within the minority group. This effect is stronger the smaller the minority group. We then conclude that majority rule fosters overall turnout and increases social welfare, whereas proportional rule fosters the participation of minorities.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10943/310
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Paper provided by Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE) in its series SIRE Discussion Papers with number 2012-07.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:edn:sirdps:310
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  2. Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2009. "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-291, May.
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  11. Sayantan Ghosal & Ben Lockwood, 2009. "Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 25-50, June.
  12. Syngjoo Choi & Shachar Kariv & Wieland Mueller & Dan Silverman, 2011. "Who Is (More) Rational?," Vienna Economics Papers 1105, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
  13. Abdul Ghafar Noury, 2004. "Abstention in the daylight: strategic calculus of voting in the EP," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7754, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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