Turnout and Power Sharing
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- Hoffman, Mitchell & León, Gianmarco & Lombardi, María, 2017.
"Compulsory voting, turnout, and government spending: Evidence from Austria,"
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- Dimitrios Xefteris & Nicholas Ziros, 2017. "Strategic vote trading under complete information," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 03-2017, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.
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- MANIQUET, François & MORELLI, Massimo & ,, 2013. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," CORE Discussion Papers 2013054, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- MANIQUET, FranÃ§ois & MORELLI, Massimo, 2015. "Approval quorums dominate participation quorums," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2666, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Carlos Sanz, 2016. "The effect of electoral systems on voter turnout: evidence from a natural experiment," Working Papers 1623, Banco de España;Working Papers Homepage.
- Grüner, Hans Peter & Tröger, Thomas, 2018. "Linear voting rules," Working Papers 18-01, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
- repec:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0457-5 is not listed on IDEAS
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2014. "Power sharing and electoral equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 705-729, April.
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- Marco Faravelli & Priscilla Man & Bang Dinh Nguyen, 2016. "Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 413-429, August.
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- Cesar Martinelli & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2017. "Communication and Information in Games of Collective Decision: A Survey of Experimental Results," Working Papers 1065, George Mason University, Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science.
- Melis Kartal, 2015. "Laboratory elections with endogenous turnout: proportional representation versus majoritarian rule," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 18(3), pages 366-384, September.
- repec:eee:ecolet:v:160:y:2017:i:c:p:64-66 is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:kap:pubcho:v:172:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0459-3 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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