Turnout and Power Sharing
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More about this item
KeywordsProportional Influence; Winner-Take-All; Underdog Compensation;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-04-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2010-04-24 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2010-04-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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