(Donâ€™t) Make My Vote Count
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS
- Blais, Andr & Dobrzynska, Agnieska & Indridason, Indridi H., 2005. "To Adopt or Not to Adopt Proportional Representation: The Politics of Institutional Choice," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(01), pages 182-190, January.
- Abdul Noury, 2004. "Abstention in Daylight: Strategic Calculus of Voting in the European Parliament," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 179-211, October.
- Sayantan Ghosal & Ben Lockwood, 2009. "Costly voting when both information and preferences differ: is turnout too high or too low?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 33(1), pages 25-50, June.
- Evren, Özgür, 2012.
"Altruism and voting: A large-turnout result that does not rely on civic duty or cooperative behavior,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 147(6), pages 2124-2157.
- Özgür Evren, 2012. "Altruism and Voting: A Large-Turnout Result That Does not Rely on Civic Duty or Cooperative Behavior," Working Papers w0173, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- Roger B. Myerson, 1998.
"Population uncertainty and Poisson games,"
International Journal of Game Theory,
Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1102R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Roger B. Myerson, 1994. "Population Uncertainty and Poisson Games," Discussion Papers 1102, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Bognar, Katalin & Börgers, Tilman & Meyer-ter-Vehn, Moritz, 2010. "An optimal Voting System when Voting is costly," MPRA Paper 29123, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stephen Coate & Michael Conlin, 2004. "A Group Rule–Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1476-1504, December.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:79:y:1985:i:01:p:62-78_22 is not listed on IDEAS
- Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December.
- Abdul Ghafar Noury, 2004. "Abstention in the daylight: strategic calculus of voting in the EP," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7754, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Krasa, Stefan & Polborn, Mattias K., 2009. "Is mandatory voting better than voluntary voting?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 275-291, May.
- Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
- Jacob Goeree & Jens Großer, 2007. "Welfare Reducing Polls," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(1), pages 51-68, April.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marco Faravelli & Priscilla Man & Bang Dinh Nguyen, 2016. "Welfare comparison of electoral systems under power sharing," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 413-429, August.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2014. "Power sharing and electoral equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 55(3), pages 705-729, April.
- Faravelli, Marco & Man, Priscilla & Walsh, Randall, 2015.
"Mandate and paternalism: A theory of large elections,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 1-23.
- Marco Faravelli & Priscilla Man & Randall Walsh, 2012. "Mandate and Paternalism: A Theory of Large Elections," Discussion Papers Series 474, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
More about this item
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:qld:uq2004:464. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SOE IT). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/decuqau.html .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.