Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104175
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02875069
Download full text from publisher
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Other versions of this item:
- Millner, Antony & Ollivier, Hélène & Simon, Leo, 2020. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 185(C).
- Antony Millner & Hélène Ollivier & Leo Simon, 2017. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," Working Papers halshs-01631494, HAL.
- Antony Millner & Hélène Ollivier & Leo Simon, 2020. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," Post-Print halshs-02875069, HAL.
- Antony Millner & Hélène Ollivier & Leo Simon, 2017. "Confirmation bias and signaling in Downsian elections," PSE Working Papers halshs-01631494, HAL.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gilat Levy, 2007.
"Decision Making in Committees: Transparency, Reputation, and Voting Rules,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 150-168, March.
- Levy, Gilat, 2005. "Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation and voting rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 543, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Levy, Gilat, 2007. "Decision making in committees: transparency, reputation, and voting rules," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3697, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Larry G. Epstein, 2006.
"An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating,"
Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 413-436.
- Larry Epstein, 2002. "An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating," RCER Working Papers 498, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER), revised Jan 2005.
- Larry Epstein, 2005. "An Axiomatic Model of Non-Bayesian Updating," RCER Working Papers 521, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2001.
"Temptation and Self-Control,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1403-1435, November.
- W. Pesendorfer & F. Gul, 1999. "Temptation and Self-Control," Princeton Economic Theory Papers 99f1, Economics Department, Princeton University.
- Gilat Levy & Ronny Razin, 2015. "Correlation Neglect, Voting Behavior, and Information Aggregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(4), pages 1634-1645, April.
- Alberto Bisin & Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv, 2015.
"Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(6), pages 1711-1737, June.
- Leeat Yariv & Alessandro Lizzeri & Alberto Bisin, 2012. "Government Policy with Time Inconsistent Voters," 2012 Meeting Papers 92, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Heidhues, Paul & Lagerlof, Johan, 2003.
"Hiding information in electoral competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 48-74, January.
- Paul Heidhues & Johan Lagerlöf, 2000. "Hiding Information in Electoral Competition," CIG Working Papers FS IV 00-06, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG), revised Feb 2002.
- Lockwood, Ben, 2017.
"Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability,"
Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 11(4), pages 471-501, February.
- Lockwood, Ben, 2017. "Confirmation Bias and Electoral Accountability," CEPR Discussion Papers 11772, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Callander, Steven & Wilson, Catherine H., 2008. "Context-dependent voting and political ambiguity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 565-581, April.
- Alessandro Lizzeri & Leeat Yariv, 2017.
"Collective Self-Control,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 213-244, August.
- Lizzeri, Alessandro & Yariv, Leeat, 2015. "Collective Self Control," CEPR Discussion Papers 10458, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gratton, Gabriele, 2014.
"Pandering and electoral competition,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 163-179.
- Gabriele Gratton, 2013. "Pandering and Electoral Competition," Discussion Papers 2012-22B, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, 1956. "The General Theory of Second Best," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 11-32.
- Charles S. Taber & Milton Lodge, 2006. "Motivated Skepticism in the Evaluation of Political Beliefs," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(3), pages 755-769, July.
- Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65, pages 135-135.
- Levy, Gilat, 2004.
"Anti-herding and strategic consultation,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 503-525, June.
- Levy, Gilat, 2004. "Anti-herding and strategic consultation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 541, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004.
"The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
- Eric Maskin, 2003. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000076, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," Economics Working Papers 0020, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Matthew Rabin & Joel L. Schrag, 1999. "First Impressions Matter: A Model of Confirmatory Bias," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 114(1), pages 37-82.
- Faruk Gul & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2012.
"The War of Information,"
Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 707-734.
- Gul, Faruk & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 2010. "The War of Information," Papers 9-13-2010, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
- Jean-François Laslier & Karine Straeten, 2004. "Electoral competition under imperfect information," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 419-446, August.
- Ashworth, Scott & Bueno De Mesquita, Ethan, 2014. "Is Voter Competence Good for Voters?: Information, Rationality, and Democratic Performance," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 108(3), pages 565-587, August.
- Alesina, Alberto, 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 796-805, September.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Arthur Fishman & Doron Klunover, 2020. "To Act or not to Act? Political competition in the presence of a threat," Papers 2010.03464, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2020.
More about this item
Keywords
Confirmation bias; Electoral competition; Pandering; Signaling;JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hal:pseptp:halshs-02875069. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Caroline Bauer). General contact details of provider: https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/ .
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.