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Content
2023
2021
- 1-3 Introduction
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 1-5 Introduction
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by David J. Hebert & Diana W. Thomas
- 1-40 Accounting for the Growth of Government
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan
- 5-27 Don’t Give the Public What It Wants; Give the Public What It Needs
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 7-25 Emergence and Entanglement in a Theory of Political Economy
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Richard E. Wagner
- 27-40 Swimming in a Tuxedo: A Systems Theory Approach to Understanding Politics
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by David J. Hebert
- 29-38 Radio is Good for You! The Rise of Educational Radio
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 39-55 Carnegie’s Lemon? The Birth of NPR
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 41-50 Government Growth
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Gordon Tullock
- 41-62 Complex and Entangled Public Policy: Here Be Dragons
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Abigail Devereaux
- 51-65 Does Technology Drive the Growth of Government?
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Tyler Cowen
- 57-84 Washington Versus The Sticks
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 63-72 Taxonomy of Entrepreneurship – A Means-Oriented Approach
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Marta Podemska-Mikluch
- 67-73 High Tax Compliance Results in Smaller Government
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Michael McKee
- 73-86 From Taciturn to Talkative Political Economy
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Adam Martin
- 75-95 Income Tax Evasion Prior to Withholding
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Randall G. Holcombe & Robert J. Gmeiner
- 85-97 Left, Right, or Always Establishment? The Bias Issue
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 87-101 Entanglement and Perverse Spontaneous Orders
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Meg Patrick Tuszynski
- 97-127 The Size and Composition of Government Spending in Multi-Party Systems
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Carlos G. Scartascini & W. Mark Crain
- 99-124 Newt [Gingrich] Cometh
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 103-110 The Tax Code as an Emergent Phenomenon
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Jeremy Horpedahl
- 111-123 Political Property Rights and Entangled Political Economy
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Alexander William Salter
- 125-133 Conclusion: What Is to Be Done?
In: The History and Politics of Public Radio
by James T. Bennett
- 125-137 The Fiscal Squeeze: Budgets Between Fiscal Illusion, Fiscal Commons, and the Tyranny of Experts
In: Emergence, Entanglement, and Political Economy
by Diana W. Thomas & Michael D. Thomas
- 129-143 A Congressional Theory of the Size of Government
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Robi Ragan & Sachin Khurana
- 145-165 Trade and the Size of Government Revisited
In: Essays on Government Growth
by Olga Haislip
2020
2019
2018
2017
- 1-5 Introduction
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 7-21 Ideologies of National Socialism, Communism, Christianity, and Islam
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 23-26 The Theory of Totalitarianism and Mature Ideocracy, Part I: Evolution and Development
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 27-38 Further Historical Cases of Totalitarian Regimes
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 39-45 Mature Ideocracies
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 47-50 The Theory of Totalitarian Regimes, Part II: Stability, Further Development, and Demise
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 51-62 The Constitution of Totalitarianism
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 63-83 Terrorism as a Means to Win or to Regain Secular Power
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 85-95 Economic and Political Problems Facing Ideocracies
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 97-115 Art and Science in Totalitarian Regimes and Mature Ideocracies
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 117-157 A Formal Model of Totalitarianism
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
- 159-160 Summary: Supreme Values, Totalitarian Regimes, and Mature Ideocracies
In: Totalitarianism, Terrorism and Supreme Values
by Peter Bernholz
2015
2014
- 1-5 Introduction
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Rachel Gibson
- 1-22 A Public Choice Model of Absolutism in Medieval England: 1066–1485
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
- 7-24 Internet Voting in a Local Election in Canada
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Nicole J. Goodman
- 23-40 The Tudor Dynasty: Perfecting Absolutism in the Era of Renaissance and Reformation, 1485–1603
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
- 25-41 Indirect Campaigning: Past, Present and Future of Voting Advice Applications
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Diego Garzia & Alexander H. Trechsel & Kristjan Vassil & Elias Dinas
- 41-68 The Stuart Doom: The Hinge of Fate for Absolutist Autocracy, 1603–1688
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
- 43-55 Digital Media and the 2010 National Elections in Brazil
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Jason Gilmore & Philip N. Howard
- 57-81 Campaigns and Social Media Communications: A Look at Digital Campaigning in the 2010 U.K. General Election
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Michael J. Jensen & Nick Anstead
- 69-96 The Seventeenth Century Philosophical Divide: Unity or Liberty
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
- 83-109 Virtual Power Plays: Social Movements, Internet Communication Technology, and Political Parties
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Deana A. Rohlinger & Leslie A. Bunnage & Jesse Klein
- 97-134 The Demise of the Divine Right of Kings, the Decline of Monarchic Power, and the Rise of Parliament, 1689–1775
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
- 111-127 Revolutionary Cells: On the Role of Texts, Tweets, and Status Updates in Unarmed Revolutions
In: The Internet and Democracy in Global Perspective
by Daniel P. Ritter & Alexander H. Trechsel
- 135-147 Hugo Grotius, John Locke, Cato’s Letters, and the American Revolution
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
- 149-165 The Zenith of Classical Liberal Philosophy in Britannia: From the Scottish Enlightenment to John Stuart Mill
In: Britannia 1066-1884
by Charles K. Rowley & Bin Wu
2013
- 1-11 Introduction and Overview
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 1-15 The Impact of The Calculus of Consent
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by J. R. Clark & Dwight R. Lee
- 15-30 From Economic Stabilization to Budget Stabilization
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 17-32 Institutions and Constitutions: The Economic World of James M. Buchanan
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Randall G. Holcombe
- 31-73 Subnational Government Tools for Budget Stabilization
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 33-42 On Some Neglected, But Profound, Contributions of Gordon Tullock
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Roger D. Congleton
- 43-64 Buchanan on Freedom
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Geoffrey Brennan & Michael Brooks
- 65-79 Choice Versus Interaction in Public Choice: Discerning the Legacy of The Calculus of Consent
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Richard E. Wagner
- 77-97 Patterns of State Savings with Budget Stabilization Funds and General Fund Surplus
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 81-88 Constitutional Change: No Escaping Hayek
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Donald J. Boudreaux
- 89-99 The Bioeconomics of Scout Bees Voting-with-the-Wings Using Less-Than-Unanimity Voting Rule: Can Bees Count, Quorum Sense, etc.?
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Janet T. Landa
- 99-117 Budget Stabilization Fund in Interaction with Balanced Budget Requirements
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 101-123 James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock: A Half-Century On
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by William F. Shughart
- 119-149 Effects of Boom-Year Savings Across Three Types of State Expenditures
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 125-141 The Politics of Medicine
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by John C. Goodman
- 143-155 Tullock, Tideman, and the Origins of the Demand-Revealing Process
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Nicolaus Tideman
- 151-169 Effects of Boom-Year Savings on Bust-Year Budgetary Actions
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 157-167 Public Choice and Two of Its Founders: An Appreciation
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by David R. Henderson
- 169-183 Public Choice in the Big Sky
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by John Baden
- 173-190 Countercyclical Fiscal Policy and Multiyear Perspective on Budgeting
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 185-194 The Public Choice Revolution and Principles of Economics Texts
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by James Gwartney
- 191-216 Boom-Year Savings and Budgetary Forecasting
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 195-213 The Calculus of Consent, Fifty Years Later: A Personal Tribute to James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Richard B. McKenzie
- 215-222 James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock: A Reflection on Two Disruptive Economists
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Bruce Yandle
- 217-272 Debt as a Countercyclical Fiscal Tool
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 223-236 Public Choice and Public Life
In: Public Choice, Past and Present
by Randy T. Simmons
- 275-300 A Framework for Fiscal Policy Coordination and Economic Stability: Countercyclical Transfer for Infrastructure
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
- 301-310 Prospects for Budget Stabilization by Subnational Governments
In: State Government Budget Stabilization
by Yilin Hou
2012
2011
- 1-7 Introduction
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 1-7 Introduction: Constitutional Myths
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Alain Marciano
- 1-11 Editors’ Introduction: The Role of Controlled Experiments in Evaluating Proposed Institutional Reforms
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Bernard Dolez & Bernard Grofman & Annie Laurent
- 1-12 Introduction: Long-Run Consequences of Electoral Rules Change: Comparing Italy and Japan
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Bernard Grofman & Daniela Giannetti
- 3-18 Veto Player Theory and Policy Change: An Introduction
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by George Tsebelis
- 9-19 Original Theories and Current Studies
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 9-23 Consent or Coercion? A Critical Analysis of the Constitutional Contract
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Randall G. Holcombe
- 13-33 Party Competition Under New Electoral Rules in Italy and Japan, 1994–2009
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Aldo Virgilio & Junko Kato
- 13-54 Election by Majority Judgment: Experimental Evidence
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Michel Balinski & Rida Laraki
- 21-31 Clarifying Concepts
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 21-42 Empirical Applications of Veto Player Analysis and Institutional Effectiveness
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Mark Hallerberg
- 25-37 Agent Type, Social Contracts, and Constitutional Mythologies
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Peter Boettke & Alexander Fink
- 33-56 Constitutional Decision Making
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 35-59 The Changing Bases of Party Support in Italy and Japan: Similarities and Differences
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Daniela Giannetti & Naoko Taniguchi
- 39-51 Constitutions, Politics, and Identity
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Alan Hamlin
- 43-68 The Veto Player Approach in Macro-Comparative Politics: Concepts and Measurement
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Detlef Jahn
- 53-69 Is the “Veil of Ignorance” in Constitutional Choice a Myth? An Empirical Exploration Informed by a Theory of Power
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Louis M. Imbeau & Steve Jacob
- 55-68 French Presidential Election: A Field Experiment on the Single Transferable Vote
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Etienne Farvaque & Hubert Jayet & Lionel Ragot
- 57-72 Legislative Decision Making
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 61-75 Nominating Candidates Under New Rules in Italy and Japan: You Cannot Bargain with Resources You Do Not Have
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Aldo Virgilio & Steven R. Reed
- 69-89 Framed-field Experiment on Approval Voting and Evaluation Voting. Some Teachings to Reform the French Presidential Electoral System
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Antoinette Baujard & Herrade Igersheim
- 69-95 Measuring Policy Positions of Veto Players in Parliamentary Democracies
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas König & Bernd Luig & Sven-Oliver Proksch & Jonathan B. Slapin
- 71-80 Checks and Balances at the OK Corral: Restraining Leviathan
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Atin Basuchoudhary & Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart
- 73-95 Electoral Decision Making
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 77-96 Electoral Reform and Factional Politics in Italy and Japan
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Daniela Giannetti & Michael F. Thies
- 81-106 Popular Sovereignty: A Case Study from the Antebellum Era
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Elizabeth Dale
- 91-104 Lessons from In Situ Experiments during French Elections
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Jean-François Laslier
- 97-113 Conclusion
In: The Calculus of Consent and Constitutional Design
by Keith L. Dougherty & Julian Edward
- 97-113 Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan: Unanticipated Outcomes?
In: A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform
by Ethan Scheiner & Filippo Tronconi
- 99-124 Mutual Veto? How Coalitions Work
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Wolfgang C. Müller & Thomas M. Meyer
- 105-121 Measuring Duvergerian Effects of the French Majority Runoff System with Laboratory Experiments: Duverger’s Laws Under the Microscope
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Bernard Dolez & Annie Laurent
- 107-119 Direct Democracy and the Constitution
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Bruno S. Frey & Alois Stutzer & Susanne Neckerman
- 121-134 Parallelisms and Paralogisms in the European Court of Justice
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Giuseppe Eusepi & Alessandra Cepparulo & Maurizio Intartaglia
- 123-141 French Double Ballot Effects: American Experiments
In: In Situ and Laboratory Experiments on Electoral Law Reform
by Jill Wittrock & Michael S. Lewis-Beck
- 125-143 Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas Saalfeld
- 135-153 The Dual Rationale of Judicial Independence
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Fabien Gélinas
- 145-164 The Sources of Bipartisan Politics in Parliamentary Democracies
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas Bräuninger & Marc Debus
- 155-170 Comparison of Central Bank and Judicial Independence
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by George Tridimas
- 165-186 Why Don’t Veto Players Use Their Power?
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas König & Dirk Junge
- 171-174 Making and Implementing the Rules of the Game: The Political Economy of Constitutional Myths and Rites
In: Constitutional Mythologies
by Jean-Michel Josselin
- 189-211 Testing the Law-Making Theories in a Parliamentary Democracy: A Roll Call Analysis of the Italian Chamber of Deputies (1988–2008)
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Luigi Curini & Francesco Zucchini
- 213-230 Domestic Veto Players, Commission Monitoring and the Implementation of European Policy
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Bernard Steunenberg
- 231-245 Strategic Voting in a Bicameral Setting
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Simon Hug
- 247-265 Game Theoretic Models and the Empirical Analysis of EU Policy Making: Strategic Interaction, Collective Decisions, and Statistical Inference
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Dirk Junge
- 269-283 Veto Players, Reform Processes and Policy Change: Concluding Remarks
In: Reform Processes and Policy Change
by Thomas König & Marc Debus
2009
Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/s/spr/stpchp.html
