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Policy Failure and Lobbying

In: The Political Economy of Lobbying

Author

Listed:
  • David Stadelmann

    (University of Bayreuth
    CREMA - Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts
    IREF - Institute for Research in Economic and Fiscal Issues)

  • Marco Frank

    (University of Bayreuth)

Abstract

Politics in parliamentary democracies can be conceptualized as a market for political services. This chapter proposes a theoretical approach to identifying market failures in the political market, with a particular focus on the role of lobby groups. Monopoly power, asymmetric information, and externalities are identified as types of market failures that hinder the efficient functioning of the political market, particularly in the presence of lobbying. These market failures can lead to policy failures, where politicians represent the interests of lobby groups instead of the preferences of citizens. The paper also suggests possible solutions to reduce market failures in the political market through increased competition.

Suggested Citation

  • David Stadelmann & Marco Frank, 2023. "Policy Failure and Lobbying," Studies in Public Choice, in: Karsten Mause & Andreas Polk (ed.), The Political Economy of Lobbying, pages 59-75, Springer.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:stpchp:978-3-031-44393-0_4
    DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-44393-0_4
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