The political economy of climate policy
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordselectoral competition; signaling; climate catastrophe; voting; intuitive criterion;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-12-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2015-12-01 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-ENE-2015-12-01 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2015-12-01 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-POL-2015-12-01 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2015-12-01 (Regulation)
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