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Shifting social norms through endorsements

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  • Gallice, Andrea
  • Grillo, Edoardo

Abstract

The attitude of individuals towards prevailing social norms can change over time. When these changes are not observable, norm abidance can remain high due to social costs. We study how an opinion leader with private information about the societal change can influence norm abidance. We show that the opinion leader can affect abidance when she is neither too ideologically sided in favor of the norm violation nor too popularity concerned. The opinion leader has a stronger impact on society when social costs are higher, the societal change is more uncertain, and citizens interact more often with like-minded individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Gallice, Andrea & Grillo, Edoardo, 2025. "Shifting social norms through endorsements," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 231(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:231:y:2025:i:c:s016726812500023x
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2025.106903
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social norms; Societal change; Opinion leaders; Endorsements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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