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Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change

Listed author(s):
  • Shapiro, Jesse M.

A journalist reports to a voter on an unknown, policy-relevant state. Competing special interests can make claims that contradict the facts but seem credible to the voter. A reputational incentive to avoid taking sides leads the journalist to report special interests' claims to the voter. In equilibrium, the voter can remain uninformed even when the journalist is perfectly informed. Communication is improved if the journalist discloses her partisan leanings. The model provides an account of persistent public ignorance on climate change that is consistent with narrative and quantitative evidence.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272716301505
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 144 (2016)
Issue (Month): C ()
Pages: 91-108

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Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:144:y:2016:i:c:p:91-108
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.10.004
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

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