Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence
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Other versions of this item:
- Zhihao Yu, 2005. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(1), pages 269-286.
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KeywordsPublic Persuasion; Lobbying; Political Advertising; Environmental Policy.;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
- F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-POL-2003-09-24 (Positive Political Economics)
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