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Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence

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Abstract

How is it that environmental groups can have a strong impact on environmental policy but without much lobbying? This paper develops a model of ‘direct’ (lobbying the government) and ‘indirect’ (persuading the public) competition for political influence and finds that they are complementary. However, an increase in the effectiveness of public persuasion, or a rise of public environmental awareness, induces substitution between the two. The findings establish that the empirical phenomenon of lack of political contribution from environmental groups may not be related to financial constraints, but to their greater effectiveness in public persuasion and the growing public environmental awareness.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhihao Yu, 2003. "Environmental Protection: A Theory of Direct and Indirect Competition for Political Influence," Carleton Economic Papers 03-07, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2005.
  • Handle: RePEc:car:carecp:03-07
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    File URL: http://www1.carleton.ca/economics/research/working-papers/carleton-economic-papers-cep-2001-2010/
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    Cited by:

    1. repec:oup:restud:v:84:y:2017:i:4:p:1652-1682. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Kiuila, O. & Rutherford, T.F., 2013. "Piecewise smooth approximation of bottom–up abatement cost curves," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 734-742.
    3. Shapiro, Jesse M., 2016. "Special interests and the media: Theory and an application to climate change," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 91-108.
    4. Petrova, Maria, 2012. "Mass media and special interest groups," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, pages 17-38.
    5. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Zvika Neeman, 2010. "Investor Protection and Interest Group Politics," NBER Chapters,in: Corporate Governance National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    7. Uhr, Daniel & Ziero Uhr, Júlia & Mueller, Bernardo, 2012. "Como as ONGs ambientais influenciam a política ambiental brasileira?," Revista Brasileira de Economia - RBE, FGV/EPGE - Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil), vol. 66(1), March.
    8. Miyamoto, Takuro, 2014. "Taxes versus quotas in lobbying by a polluting industry with private information on abatement costs," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 141-167.
    9. Yann Bramoullé & Caroline Orset, 2015. "Manufacturing Doubt," Post-Print hal-01591999, HAL.
    10. Georgy Egorov & Bård Harstad, 2017. "Private Politics and Public Regulation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 84(4), pages 1652-1682.
    11. Thomas P. Lyon & John W. Maxwell, 2008. "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Environment: A Theoretical Perspective," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, pages 240-260.
    12. repec:kap:iaecre:v:20:y:2014:i:1:p:73-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Laing, Timothy & Palmer, Charles, 2015. "Economy-wide impacts of REDD when there is political influence," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 107-126.
    14. Wolton, Stephane, 2016. "Lobbying, Inside and Out: How Special Interest Groups Influence Policy Choices," MPRA Paper 68637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    15. Louis Jaeck & Sehjeong Kim, 2014. "The Impact of EMU Enlargement on Structural Reforms: A Political Economy Approach," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 20(1), pages 73-86, February.
    16. Fabien Prieur & Benteng Zou, 2017. "On the impact of indirect competition for political influence on environmental policy," CREA Discussion Paper Series 17-16, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
    17. Couttenier, Mathieu & Hatte, Sophie, 2016. "Mass media effects on non-governmental organizations," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 57-72.
    18. Eric C. Edwards & Oscar Cristi & Gonzalo Edwards & Gary D. Libecap, 2016. "An Illiquid Market in the Desert: Estimating the Cost of Water Trade Restrictions in Northern Chile," NBER Working Papers 21869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. repec:fgv:epgrbe:v:66:n:1:a:4 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public Persuasion; Lobbying; Political Advertising; Environmental Policy.;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business

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