Pandering to Persuade
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- Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik, 2010. "Pandering to Persuade," Levine's Bibliography 661465000000000197, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Yeon-Koo Che & Wouter Dessein & Navin Kartik, 2010. "Pandering to Persuade," Levine's Bibliography 661465000000000163, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Che, Yeon-Koo & Dessein, Wouter & Kartik, Navin, 2010. "Pandering to Persuade," CEPR Discussion Papers 7970, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
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