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Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation

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  • Matthew Mitchell

Abstract

Consumers rely on intermediaries (“influencers”) such as social media recommendations to provide information about products. The advice may be mixed with endorsement in a way that is unobservable to the follower, creating a trade‐off for influencers between the best advice and the most revenue. This article models the dynamic relationship between an influencer and a follower. The relationship evolves between periods of less and more revenue. The model can provide insight into policies such as the Federal Trade Commission's mandatory disclosure rules. An opt‐in policy may be superior: it deregulates influencers who are reaping the rewards of past good advice.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Mitchell, 2021. "Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 3-21, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:randje:v:52:y:2021:i:1:p:3-21
    DOI: 10.1111/1756-2171.12359
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Isaac Owusu Asante & Yushi Jiang & Xiao Luo, 2023. "Does it matter how I stream? Comparative analysis of livestreaming marketing formats on Amazon Live," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-12, December.
    2. Ron Berman & Aniko Oery & Xudong Zheng, 2023. "Influence or Advertise: The Role of Social Learning in Influencer Marketing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2358, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    3. Cao, Zike & Belo, Rodrigo, 2023. "Effects of Explicit Sponsorship Disclosure on User Engagement in Social Media Influencer Marketing," SocArXiv b8tsg, Center for Open Science.
    4. Mohamed Mostagir & James Siderius, 2023. "Strategic Reviews," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 69(2), pages 904-921, February.
    5. Andrea Gallice & Edoardo Grillo, 2022. "Legitimize through Endorsement," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 680 JEL Classification: C, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    6. Daniel Ershov & Yanting, He & Stephan Seiler, 2023. "How Much Influencer Marketing Is Undisclosed? Evidence from Twitter," CESifo Working Paper Series 10743, CESifo.

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