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Regulating commissions in markets with advice

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  • Inderst, Roman

Abstract

The paper explores the implications of regulating commissions in markets with advice. It provides a review of recent contributions dealing with policies that mandate disclosure, impose caps on commissions, restrict the steepness of commissions, or require the deferral of commissions.

Suggested Citation

  • Inderst, Roman, 2015. "Regulating commissions in markets with advice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 137-141.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:indorg:v:43:y:2015:i:c:p:137-141
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2015.05.005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessandro De Chiara & Marco A. Schwarz, 2020. "A Dynamic Theory of Regulatory Capture," Working Papers 2020-12, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    2. Fang Liu & Alexander Rasch & Marco Alexander Schwarz & Christian Waibel, 2020. "The Role of Diagnostic Ability in Markets for Expert Services," CESifo Working Paper Series 8704, CESifo.
    3. Jun Honda & Roman Inderst, 2017. "Nonlinear incentives and advisor bias," Working Papers 2017-26, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    4. Felix Gottschalk, 2021. "Regulating Markets with Advice: An Experimental Study," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 83(1), pages 1-31, February.
    5. Matthew Mitchell, 2021. "Free ad(vice): internet influencers and disclosure regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(1), pages 3-21, March.
    6. Matthew Mitchell, 2018. "Free (Ad)vice," 2018 Meeting Papers 1194, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Pasquini, Ricardo A., 2021. "Effects of regulating the brokerage commission in the rental market: Evidence from Buenos Aires," Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    8. Dell'Era, Michele, 2019. "Talking to Influence and the Consulting Paradox," MPRA Paper 93803, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Michele Dell’Era, 2018. "Financial Transaction Taxes and Expert Advice," Working and Discussion Papers WP 4/2018, Research Department, National Bank of Slovakia.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Commissions; Advice;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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