Peddling Influence through Intermediaries
A sender may communicate with a decision maker through intermediaries. In this model, an objective sender and intermediary pass on information truthfully, while biased ones favor a particular agenda but also have reputational concerns. I show that the biased sender and the biased intermediary's reporting truthfulness are strategic complements. The biased sender is less likely to use an intermediary than an objective sender if his reputational concerns are low, but more likely to do so if his reputational concerns are moderate. Moreover, the biased sender may be more likely to use an intermediary perceived to be more biased. (JEL D82, D83)
Volume (Year): 100 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Li, Ming & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2009.
"Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission,"
09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
- LI, Ming & MYLOVANOV, Tymofiy, 2010. "Credibility for Sale - The Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission," Cahiers de recherche 08-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
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