Peddling Influence through Intermediaries
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References listed on IDEAS
- Malueg, David A. & Tsutsui, Shunichi O., 1996. "Duopoly information exchange: The case of unknown slope," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 119-136.
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"Credibility for Sale: the Effect of Disclosure on Information Acquisition and Transmission,"
09008, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2009.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Kolotilin, Anton & Li, Hao & Li, Wei, 2013. "Optimal limited authority for principal," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(6), pages 2344-2382.
- Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2015.
"Information transmission in nested sender–receiver games,"
Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(3), pages 543-569, April.
- Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po Economics Discussion Papers 2014-04, Sciences Po Departement of Economics.
- Sidartha Gordon & Ying Chen, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Sciences Po publications 2014-04, Sciences Po.
- Ying Chen & Sidartha Gordon, 2014. "Information Transmission in Nested Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers hal-00973071, HAL.
- Inderst, Roman, 2015. "Regulating commissions in markets with advice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 137-141.
- repec:eee:gamebe:v:113:y:2019:i:c:p:306-338 is not listed on IDEAS
More about this item
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
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