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Competence Implies Credibility

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Listed:
  • Giuseppe Moscarini

Abstract

The (reputation for) competence of a central bank at doing its job makes monetary policy under discretion credible and transparent. Based on its reading of the state of the economy, the central bank announces its policy intentions to the public in a cheap-talk game. The precision of its private signal measures its competence. The fineness of the equilibrium message space measures its credibility and transparency. This is increasing in the competence/inflation bias ratio: the public expects a competent central bank to use its discretion more to pursue its "objective" targets than to surprise expectations and stimulate output. (JEL E52, E58)

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Moscarini, 2007. "Competence Implies Credibility," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 37-63, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:97:y:2007:i:1:p:37-63
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.37
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.97.1.37
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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