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The value of central bank transparency when agents are learning

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  • Berardi, Michele
  • Duffy, John

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  • Berardi, Michele & Duffy, John, 2007. "The value of central bank transparency when agents are learning," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 9-29, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:23:y:2007:i:1:p:9-29
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Faust, Jon & Svensson, Lars E O, 2001. "Transparency and Credibility: Monetary Policy with Unobservable Goals," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 42(2), pages 369-397, May.
    2. McCallum, Bennett T., 1997. "Crucial issues concerning central bank independence," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 99-112, June.
    3. Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
    4. James B. Bullard, 2006. "The learnability criterion and monetary policy," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 203-217.
    5. Richard Clarida & Jordi Galí & Mark Gertler, 2000. "Monetary Policy Rules and Macroeconomic Stability: Evidence and Some Theory," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 147-180.
    6. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 807-824.
    7. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    8. Bullard, James & Mitra, Kaushik, 2002. "Learning about monetary policy rules," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 1105-1129, September.
    9. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
    10. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2006. "Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(1), pages 15-38, March.
    11. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 26, European Central Bank.
    12. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
    13. Bennett T. McCallum & Edward Nelson, 1999. "Performance of Operational Policy Rules in an Estimated Semiclassical Structural Model," NBER Chapters, in: Monetary Policy Rules, pages 15-56, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Adaptive learning and monetary policy design," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 1045-1084.
    15. Woodford, Michael, 1999. "Optimal Monetary Policy Inertia," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 67(0), pages 1-35, Supplemen.
    16. Petra M. Geraats, 2002. "Central Bank Transparency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 532-565, November.
    17. Lars E. O. Svensson, 2003. "Monetary policy and learning," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, issue Q3, pages 11-16.
    18. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
    19. Modica, Salvatore & Rustichini, Aldo, 1999. "Unawareness and Partitional Information Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 265-298, May.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
    2. Ascari, Guido & Florio, Anna & Gobbi, Alessandro, 2017. "Transparency, expectations anchoring and inflation target," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 261-273.
    3. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2009. "Expectations, Learning and Monetary Policy: An Overview of Recent Research," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Carl E. Walsh & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.), Monetary Policy under Uncertainty and Learning, edition 1, volume 13, chapter 2, pages 027-076, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Athina Zervoyianni & Athanasios Anastasiou & Andreas Anastasiou, 2014. "Does central bank independence really matter? Re-assessing the role of the independence of monetary policy-makers in macroeconomic outcomes," International Journal of Economics and Business Research, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(4), pages 427-473.
    5. Alberto Locarno, 2012. "Monetary policy in a model with misspecified, heterogeneous and ever-changing expectations," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 888, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. repec:eee:dyncon:v:103:y:2019:i:c:p:25-42 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    8. repec:wly:jmoncb:v:49:y:2017:i:8:p:1673-1713 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Anna Agliari & Domenico Massaro & Nicolò Pecora & Alessandro Spelta, 2017. "Inflation Targeting, Recursive Inattentiveness, and Heterogeneous Beliefs," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(7), pages 1587-1619, October.
    10. Ma, Yong & Li, Shushu, 2015. "Bayesian estimation of China's monetary policy transparency: A New Keynesian approach," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 236-248.
    11. Kinda Hachem & Jing Cynthia Wu, 2017. "Inflation Announcements and Social Dynamics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(8), pages 1673-1713, December.
    12. Guse, Eran A., 2008. "Learning in a misspecified multivariate self-referential linear stochastic model," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1517-1542, May.
    13. Hommes, C.H. & Lustenhouwer, J., 2015. "Inflation Targeting and Liquidity Traps under Endogenous Credibility," CeNDEF Working Papers 15-03, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    14. Papadamou, Stephanos & Sidiropoulos, Moïse & Spyromitros, Eleftherios, 2014. "Does central bank transparency affect stock market volatility?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 362-377.
    15. Bonam, Dennis & Goy, Gavin, 2019. "Home biased expectations and macroeconomic imbalances in a monetary union," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 25-42.
    16. Michele Berardi, 2009. "Monetary Policy with Heterogeneous and Misspecified Expectations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 41(1), pages 79-100, February.
    17. repec:eee:poleco:v:55:y:2018:i:c:p:391-416 is not listed on IDEAS
    18. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Carsten Hefeker, 2011. "Policy Uncertainty and Economic Reforms in a Monetary Union," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 12(3), pages 274-285, August.
    20. Michele Berard, 2006. "Monetary policy with heterogeneous and misspecified expectations," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0637, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    21. Tomáš Holinka, 2010. "Proces učení a transparentnost centrální banky
      [Learning Process and Transparency of Central Bank]
      ," Politická ekonomie, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2010(4), pages 458-470.

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