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Inflation Announcements and Social Dynamics

Author

Listed:
  • Jing Cynthia Wu

    (University of Chicago)

  • Kinda Hachem

    (University of Chicago)

Abstract

This paper investigates the effectiveness of central bank communication when firms have heterogeneous inflation expectations that are updated through social dynamics. The bank's credibility evolves with these dynamics and determines how well its announcements anchor expectations. We show that trying to eliminate high inflation by abruptly introducing a low inflation target can lead to short-term overshooting whereas gradually introducing the target directs the economy to the long-term goal more quickly and smoothly. In contrast, avoiding a protracted deflation requires aggressive announcements that could more easily be accommodated under price-level targeting. For an inflation targeting central bank, we find that varying two dimensions of quantitative easing - number of rounds and intensity of announcements - provides an effective way to stem deflationary expectations without altering inflation targets.

Suggested Citation

  • Jing Cynthia Wu & Kinda Hachem, 2013. "Inflation Announcements and Social Dynamics," 2013 Meeting Papers 238, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    • Handle: RePEc:red:sed013:238
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Ricco, Giovanni & Callegari, Giovanni & Cimadomo, Jacopo, 2016. "Signals from the government: Policy disagreement and the transmission of fiscal shocks," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 107-118.
    3. Jason Choi & Andrew Foerster, 2021. "Optimal Monetary Policy Regime Switches," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 42, pages 333-346, October.
    4. Chengcheng Jia & Jing Cynthia Wu, 2021. "Average Inflation Targeting: Time Inconsistency And Intentional Ambiguity," Working Papers 21-19R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 01 Feb 2022.
    5. Carola Binder & Wesley Janson & Randal Verbrugge, 2023. "Out of Bounds: Do SPF Respondents Have Anchored Inflation Expectations?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(2-3), pages 559-576, March.
    6. Jasmina Arifovic & Alex Grimaud & Isabelle Salle & Gauthier Vermandel, 2025. "Social Learning and Monetary Policy at the Effective Lower Bound," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2-3), pages 439-475, March.
    7. Pooja Kapoor & Sujata Kar, 2023. "A review of inflation expectations and perceptions research in the past four decades: a bibliometric analysis," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 279-302, May.
    8. Galanis, Giorgos & Kollias, Iraklis & Leventides, Ioanis & Lustenhouwer, Joep, 2025. "Generalizing heuristic switching models and a (boundedly) rational route away from randomness," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 177(C).
    9. Marcus Giamattei, 2022. "Can Cold Turkey Reduce Inflation Inertia? Evidence on Disinflation and Level‐k Thinking from a Laboratory Experiment," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(8), pages 2477-2517, December.
    10. Jia, Chengcheng & Wu, Jing Cynthia, 2023. "Average inflation targeting: Time inconsistency and ambiguous communication," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 69-86.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E17 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - Forecasting and Simulation: Models and Applications
    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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