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Average Inflation Targeting: Time Inconsistency And Intentional Ambiguity

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Abstract

We study the implications of the Fed's new policy framework of average inflation targeting (AIT) and its ambiguous communication. The central bank has the incentive to deviate from its announced AIT and implement inflation targeting ex post to maximize social welfare. We show two motives for ambiguous communication about the horizon over which the central bank averages inflation as a result of time inconsistency. First, it is optimal for the central bank to announce different horizons depending on the state of the economy. Second, ambiguous communication helps the central bank gain credibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Chengcheng Jia & Jing Cynthia Wu, 2021. "Average Inflation Targeting: Time Inconsistency And Intentional Ambiguity," Working Papers 21-19R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 01 Feb 2022.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwq:93039
    DOI: 10.26509/frbc-wp-202119r
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nessen, Marianne & Vestin, David, 2005. "Average Inflation Targeting," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 37(5), pages 837-863, October.
    2. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Michael Woodford, 2003. "The Zero Bound on Interest Rates and Optimal Monetary Policy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 34(1), pages 139-235.
    3. Kinda Hachem & Jing Cynthia Wu, 2017. "Inflation Announcements and Social Dynamics," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(8), pages 1673-1713, December.
    4. Robert Amano & Stefano Gnocchi & Sylvain Leduc & Joel Wagner, 2020. "Average is Good Enough: Average-inflation Targeting and the ELB," Staff Working Papers 20-31, Bank of Canada.
    5. Jasmina Arifovic & James Bullard & Olena Kostyshyna, 2013. "Social Learning and Monetary Policy Rules," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 123(567), pages 38-76, March.
    6. John B. Taylor, 1999. "Monetary Policy Rules," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number tayl99-1, March.
    7. Thomas M. Mertens & John C. Williams, 2019. "Tying Down the Anchor: Monetary Policy Rules and the Lower Bound on Interest Rates," Working Paper Series 2019-14, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
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    Cited by:

    1. Budianto, Flora & Nakata, Taisuke & Schmidt, Sebastian, 2023. "Average inflation targeting and the interest rate lower bound," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 152(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bayesian VARs; stochastic volatility; pandemics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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