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Transparency, expectations anchoring and inflation target

Author

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  • Ascari, Guido
  • Florio, Anna
  • Gobbi, Alessandro

Abstract

In various speeches, former Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke contrasted the proposal of setting a higher inflation target by claiming that it could unanchor inflation expectations. A standard New Keynesian framework with learning supports this claim both asymptotically, because a higher inflation target shrinks the E-stability region when a central bank follows a Taylor rule, and in the transition phase, because a higher inflation target slows down the speed of convergence of expectations. Transparency helps anchoring expectations. However, the importance of being transparent diminishes with the level of the inflation target. Finally, the higher the inflation target, the more policy should respond to inflation and the less to output to guarantee E-stability. Hence, a policy that increases both the inflation target and the monetary policy response to output would be “reckless”.

Suggested Citation

  • Ascari, Guido & Florio, Anna & Gobbi, Alessandro, 2017. "Transparency, expectations anchoring and inflation target," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 261-273.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:91:y:2017:i:c:p:261-273
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.11.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Trend Inflation; Learning; Monetary Policy; Transparency;

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy

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