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Central banks' macroeconomic projections and learning

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  • Giuseppe Ferrero

    () (Bank of Italy, Economics and International Relations)

  • Alessandro Secchi

    () (Bank of Italy, Economics and International Relations)

Abstract

We study the impact of the publication of central banks� macroeconomic projections on the dynamic properties of an economy where (i) private agents have incomplete information and form their expectations using recursive learning algorithms; (ii) the short-term nominal interest rate is set as a linear function of the deviations of inflation and real output from their target level; and (iii) the central bank, ignoring the exact mechanism used by private agents to form expectations, assumes that it can be reasonably approximated by perfect rationality and releases macroeconomic projections consistent with this assumption. The set of macroeconomic projections released by the central bank crucially affects the results in terms of stability of the equilibrium and speed of convergence of the learning process. In particular, while the publication of inflation and output gap projections enlarges the set of interest rate rules associated with stable equilibria and helps agents to learn faster, the announcement of the interest rate path exerts the opposite effect. In the latter case, in order to stabilize expectations and to speed up the learning process the response of the policy instrument to inflation should be stronger than when there is no announcement.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Ferrero & Alessandro Secchi, 2010. "Central banks' macroeconomic projections and learning," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 782, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdi:wptemi:td_782_10
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    7. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2008. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Chapters, in: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pages 247-289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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    Cited by:

    1. Evans, George W. & Honkapohja, Seppo, 2011. "Learning as a Rational Foundation for Macroeconomics and Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 8340, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Martina Cecioni & Giuseppe Ferrero & Alessandro Secchi, 2018. "Unconventional Monetary Policy in Theory and in Practice," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Douglas D Evanoff & George G Kaufman & A G Malliaris (ed.), Innovative Federal Reserve Policies During the Great Financial Crisis, chapter 1, pages 1-36, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2017. "The Stabilizing Role of Forward Guidance: A Macro Experiment," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168063, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    4. Ascari, Guido & Florio, Anna & Gobbi, Alessandro, 2017. "Transparency, expectations anchoring and inflation target," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 261-273.
    5. Alberto Locarno, 2012. "Monetary policy in a model with misspecified, heterogeneous and ever-changing expectations," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 888, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    6. Ahrens, Steffen & Lustenhouwer, Joep & Tettamanzi, Michele, 2018. "The stabilizing role of forward guidance: A macro experiment," BERG Working Paper Series 137, Bamberg University, Bamberg Economic Research Group.
    7. Marzioni, Stefano, 2014. "Signals and learning in a new Keynesian economy," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 114-131.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    monetary policy; transparency; interest rates; learning; speed of convergence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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