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Announcements of interest rate forecasts: Do policymakers stick to them?

Author

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  • Nikola Mirkov

    () (Universität St.Gallen)

  • Gisle James Natvik

    () (Norges Bank (Central Bank of Norway))

Abstract

If central banks value the ex-post accuracy of their forecasts, previously announced interest rate paths might affect the current policy rate. We explore whether this "forecast adherence" has influenced the monetary policies of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand and the Norges Bank, the two central banks with the longest history of publishing interest rate paths. We derive and estimate a policy rule for a central bank that is reluctant to deviate from its forecasts. The rule can nest a variety of interest rate rules. We find that policymakers appear to be constrained by their most recently announced forecasts.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikola Mirkov & Gisle James Natvik, 2013. "Announcements of interest rate forecasts: Do policymakers stick to them?," Working Paper 2013/11, Norges Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:bno:worpap:2013_11
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    File URL: http://www.norges-bank.no/en/Published/Papers/Working-Papers/2013/WP-201311/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Hilde C. Bjørnland & Leif Anders Thorsrud & Sepideh K. Zahiri, 2016. "Do central banks respond timely to developments in the global economy?," Working Papers No 8/2016, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
    2. Kool, Clemens J. M. & Thornton, Daniel L., 2015. "How Effective Is Central Bank Forward Guidance?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 97(4), pages 303-322.
    3. Paul Hubert & Fabien Labondance, 2016. "The effect of ECB forward guidance on policy expectations," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2016-30, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
    4. Gerlach, Stefan & Stuart, Rebecca, 2016. "Joining the dots: The FOMC and the future path of policy rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 11618, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. repec:bla:jecsur:v:31:y:2017:i:3:p:678-711 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Richhild Moessner & David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2017. "Communication About Future Policy Rates In Theory And Practice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 678-711, July.
    7. Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn & Yulin Liu, 2015. "Forward Guidance Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 5375, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Interest rates; Forecasts; Taylor rule; Adherence;

    JEL classification:

    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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