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Forward Guidance Contracts

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  • Gersbach, Hans
  • Hahn, Volker
  • Liu, Yulin

Abstract

We examine “Forward Guidance Contracts,” which penalize central bankers for choosing high interest rates. We integrate those contracts into the New Keynesian Framework and show that they can be used to overcome a liquidity trap. Moreover, although the government takes only a share of the social benefits into account when it has to decide whether to offer the contract, we demonstrate that for plausible parameter values the government will always find it desirable to offer the contract in a liquidity trap but not in normal times. Finally, we show that the optimal duration of such contracts is typically very short.

Suggested Citation

  • Gersbach, Hans & Hahn, Volker & Liu, Yulin, 2019. "Forward Guidance Contracts," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 23(8), pages 3386-3423, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:macdyn:v:23:y:2019:i:8:p:3386-3423_12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Liu, Yulin & Tischhauser, Martin, 2021. "Versatile forward guidance: escaping or switching?," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 127(C).
    2. Richhild Moessner & David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2017. "Communication About Future Policy Rates In Theory And Practice: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 678-711, July.
    3. Salomon Faure & Hans Gersbach, 2021. "On the money creation approach to banking," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 265-318, September.
    4. Faure, Salomon & Gersbach, Hans, 2016. "Money creation and destruction," CFS Working Paper Series 555, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E31 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Price Level; Inflation; Deflation

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