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When Can Policy Makers Anchor Expectations? Dynamic controllability and the limits to time inconsistency

Listed author(s):
  • Di Bartolomeo Giovanni
  • Hughes Hallett Andrew
  • Acocella Nicola

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://wp.comunite.it/data/wp_no_104_2013.pdf
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Paper provided by Department of Communication, University of Teramo in its series wp.comunite with number 0104.

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Date of creation: Sep 2013
Handle: RePEc:ter:wpaper:0104
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://wp.comunite.it/

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  1. Jon Faust & Lars E.O. Svensson, 1999. "The Equilibrium Degree of Transparency and Control in Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 7152, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Nicola Acocella, 2005. "Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games," Working Papers 2005.132, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  3. repec:pri:cepsud:161blinder is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Christopher L. House & Matthew D. Shapiro, 2004. "Phased-In Tax Cuts and Economic Activity," NBER Working Papers 10415, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Sargent, Thomas J & Wallace, Neil, 1975. ""Rational" Expectations, the Optimal Monetary Instrument, and the Optimal Money Supply Rule," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(2), pages 241-254, April.
  6. Eusepi, Stefano & Preston, Bruce, 2007. "Central bank communication and expectations stabilization," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue March, pages 1-43.
  7. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
  8. Jeffrey D. Amado & Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2003. "Communication and Monetary Policy," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1405, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  9. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-666, September.
  10. Richhild Moessner & William R. Nelson, 2008. "Central Bank Policy Rate Guidance and Financial Market Functioning," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 4(4), pages 193-226, December.
  11. David-Jan Jansen & Jakob de Haan, 2004. "Look Who's Talking: ECB communication during the first years of EMU," DNB Working Papers 007, Netherlands Central Bank, Research Department.
  12. Jan Libich, 2009. "A Note on the Anchoring Effect of Explicit Inflation Targets," CAMA Working Papers 2009-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
  13. Canova, Fabio & Gambetti, Luca, 2009. "Do expectations matter? The Great Moderation revisited," CEPR Discussion Papers 7597, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  14. Alan S. Blinder & Michael Ehrmann & Marcel Fratzscher & Jakob De Haan & David-Jan Jansen, 2008. "Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(4), pages 910-945, December.
  15. Richhild Moessner & William Nelson, 2008. "Central bank policy rate guidance and financial market functioning," BIS Working Papers 246, Bank for International Settlements.
  16. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2005. "How should central banks communicate?," Working Paper Series 0557, European Central Bank.
  17. Holly,Sean & Hughes Hallet,Andrew, 2010. "Optimal Control, Expectations and Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521126335, December.
  18. Mertens, Karel & Ravn, Morten O, 2009. "Measuring the Impact of Fiscal Policy in the Face of Anticipation: A Structural VAR Approach," CEPR Discussion Papers 7423, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  19. Giuseppe Ferrero & Alessandro Secchi, 2009. "The Announcement of Monetary Policy Intentions," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 720, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  20. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2008. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Chapters, in: Asset Prices and Monetary Policy, pages 247-289 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  21. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola, 2008. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," wp.comunite 0034, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  22. Carl E. Walsh, 2007. "Optimal Economic Transparency," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 3(1), pages 5-36, March.
  23. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-630, October.
  24. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  25. Hallett, A. Hughes & Ma, Y. & Yin, Y. P., 1996. "Hybrid algorithms with automatic switching for solving nonlinear equation systems," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 20(6-7), pages 1051-1071.
  26. Fisher, P. G. & Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1988. "Efficient solution techniques for linear and non-linear rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 635-657, November.
  27. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  28. Bauke Visser & Otto H. Swank, 2007. "On Committees of Experts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(1), pages 337-372.
  29. ACOCELLA, Nicola & DI BARTOLOMEO, Giovanni & HUGHES HALLETT, Andrew & PIACQUADIO, Paolo G., 2009. "Announcement wars as an equilibrium selection device," CORE Discussion Papers 2009077, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  30. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kahn, Charles M, 1980. "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1305-1311, July.
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