IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations

  • Hallett, Andrew Hughes
  • Acocella, Nicola
  • Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni

This paper shows the relationship between static controllability (well-known as Tinbergen's golden rule) and the existence and other properties of the Nash equilibrium in a dynamic setting augmented with rational expectations (RE) for future behavior. We derive new theorems which state sufficient conditions for the neutrality of economic policy, and necessary conditions for the existence of equilibrium in strategic games. We show these conditions are not affected by the assumption of RE. We are also able to show how to determine who will dominate in these equilibria, and who will find their policies to be ineffective, without having to solve out for all the possible outcomes explicitly.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6X4M-4WVF6K1-1/2/ebbe0a0c39d3cae6f982958a762f909c
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Macroeconomics.

Volume (Year): 32 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 55-67

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:32:y:2010:i:1:p:55-67
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622617

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," wp.comunite 0020, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
  2. Glenn D. Rudebusch & John C. Williams, 2006. "Revealing the Secrets of the Temple: The Value of Publishing Central Bank Interest Rate Projections," NBER Working Papers 12638, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström , Ulf, 2004. "Robust monetary policy in the New-Keynesian framework," Research Discussion Papers 31/2004, Bank of Finland.
  4. Söderström, Ulf, 2000. "Monetary policy with uncertain parameters," Working Paper Series 0013, European Central Bank.
  5. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January.
  6. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  7. Olivier Blanchard & Jordi Gali, 2005. "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model," NBER Working Papers 11806, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Fisher, P. G. & Hallett, A. J. Hughes, 1988. "Efficient solution techniques for linear and non-linear rational expectations models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 635-657, November.
  9. Evi Pappa, 2004. "Do the ECB and the Fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  10. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew, 2008. "When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability," CEPR Discussion Papers 7078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Pierpaolo Benigno & Michael Woodford, 2004. "Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policy: A Linear-Quadratic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2003, Volume 18, pages 271-364 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
  13. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kahn, Charles M, 1980. "The Solution of Linear Difference Models under Rational Expectations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(5), pages 1305-11, July.
  14. Acocella, N. & Di Bartolomeo, G., 2006. "Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 213-218, February.
  15. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2002. "Monetary Policy, Expectations and Commitment," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2005-11, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 06 Apr 2005.
  16. George W. Evans & Seppo Honkapohja, 2003. "Expectations and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 807-824, October.
  17. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September.
  18. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-30, October.
  19. Blanchard, Olivier & Galí, Jordi, 2006. "A New Keynesian model with unemployment," CFS Working Paper Series 2007/08, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
  20. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521264440 is not listed on IDEAS
  21. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
  22. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hallett, Andrew Hughes, 2007. "Dynamic Controllability With Overlapping Targets: Or Why Target Independence May Not Be Good For You," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 202-213, April.
  23. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. " The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
  24. Brock,W.A. & Durlauf,S.N., 2004. "Local robustness analysis : theory and application," Working papers 22, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  25. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, 1987. "Monopolistic Competition and the Effects of Aggregate Demand," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 647-66, September.
  26. Hughes Hallett, Andrew J, 1989. "Econometrics and the Theory of Economic Policy: The Tinbergen-Theil Contributions 40 Years On," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 189-214, January.
  27. Stehn, Sven Jari & Vines, David, 2008. "Strategic Interactions between an Independent Central Bank and a Myopic Government with Government Debt," CEPR Discussion Papers 6913, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  28. Gnocchi, Stefano, 2006. "Optimal simple monetary policy rules and non-atomistic wage setters in a New-Keynesian framework," Working Paper Series 0690, European Central Bank.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jmacro:v:32:y:2010:i:1:p:55-67. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.