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The Emerging New Theory of Economic Policy

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This paper outlines the evolution of the theory of economic policy from the classical contributions of Ragnar Frisch, Ian Tinbergen, Bent Hansen, Henri Theil to recent work in the field of strategic interaction. The new, emerging theory of economic policy, albeit rooted in the classical paradigm, is consistent with rational expectations, and is particularly important for model building, as it states general conditions for the effectiveness of economic policy and the existence of equilibrium.

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File URL: http://www.iei1946.it/RePEc/ccg/ACOCELLA_DIBARTOLOMEO%20135_150.pdf
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Article provided by Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova in its journal Economia Internazionale / International Economics.

Volume (Year): 61 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2-3 ()
Pages: 135-150

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Handle: RePEc:ris:ecoint:0023
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  1. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
  2. Francesco Lippi, 2003. "Strategic Monetary Policy with Non-Atomistic Wage Setters," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 70(4), pages 909-919.
  3. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2008. "Robust Monetary Policy In The New Keynesian Framework," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(S1), pages 126-135, April.
  4. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
  5. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September.
  6. Jerger, Jurgen, 2002. "Socially optimal monetary policy institutions," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 761-781, November.
  7. Barro, Robert J, 1974. "Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(6), pages 1095-1117, Nov.-Dec..
  8. Gruner, Hans Peter & Hefeker, Carsten, 1999. " How Will EMU Affect Inflation and Unemployment in Europe?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 101(1), pages 33-47, March.
  9. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context," Macroeconomics 0504034, EconWPA.
  10. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hallett, Andrew Hughes, 2007. "Dynamic Controllability With Overlapping Targets: Or Why Target Independence May Not Be Good For You," Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(02), pages 202-213, April.
  11. Mark Gertler & Jordi Gali & Richard Clarida, 1999. "The Science of Monetary Policy: A New Keynesian Perspective," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1661-1707, December.
  12. Olivier Blanchard & Jordi Galí, 2007. "Real Wage Rigidities and the New Keynesian Model," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(s1), pages 35-65, 02.
  13. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2004. "Non-neutrality of monetary policy in policy games," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 695-707, September.
  14. Gylfason, Thorvaldur & Lindbeck, Assar, 1994. "The Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 79(1-2), pages 33-46, April.
  15. David Soskice & Torben Iversen, 2000. "The Nonneutrality of Monetary Policy with Large Price or Wage Setters," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(1), pages 265-284.
  16. Acocella, N. & Di Bartolomeo, G., 2006. "Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 213-218, February.
  17. Hallett, Andrew Hughes & Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2010. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-67, March.
  18. Ireland, Peter N., 1999. "Does the time-consistency problem explain the behavior of inflation in the United States?," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 279-291, October.
  19. Richard Bellman, 1957. "On a Dynamic Programming Approach to the Caterer Problem--I," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 3(3), pages 270-278, April.
  20. Holly,Sean & Hughes Hallet,Andrew, 2010. "Optimal Control, Expectations and Uncertainty," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521126335, February.
  21. Leitemo, Kai & Söderström, Ulf, 2004. "Robust monetary policy in the New-Keynesian framework," Research Discussion Papers 31/2004, Bank of Finland.
  22. Guzzo, Vincenzo & Velasco, Andres, 1999. "The case for a populist Central Banker," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(7), pages 1317-1344, June.
  23. Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2003. "How severe is the time-inconsistency problem in monetary policy?," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Sum, pages 17-33.
  24. Blanchard, Olivier & Galί, Jordi, 2006. "A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment," Kiel Working Papers 1335, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
  25. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 19-46, January.
  26. Hughes Hallett, Andrew J, 1989. "Econometrics and the Theory of Economic Policy: The Tinbergen-Theil Contributions 40 Years On," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 41(1), pages 189-214, January.
  27. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
  28. Pindyck, Robert S, 1973. "Optimal Policies for Economic Stabilization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(3), pages 529-560, May.
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