Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context
In the last 20 years issues of policy effectiveness and neutrality (notably with reference to monetary policy) have been increasingly raised in the context of static LQ (linear-quadratic) policy games. The general conditions ensuring policy non-neutrality in a strategic environment remains however to be inquired. We state these conditions by generalizing the classical theory of economic policy developed by Tinbergen and others to such a context. We also state necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of Nash and Stackelberg equilibria. We finally show that the conditions for monetary policy effectiveness asserted in the literature respect our general conditions.
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