Controllability and non-neutrality of economic policy: The Tinbergen’s approach in a strategic context
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References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Acocella, N. & Di Bartolomeo, G., 2006.
"Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games,"
Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 213-218, February.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Nicola Acocella, 2005. "Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games," Working Papers 2005.132, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Tinbergen And Theil Meet Nash: Controllability In Policy Games," Macroeconomics 0504036, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2005.
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2007.
"Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation,"
0020, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," MPRA Paper 4419, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2008. "The Emerging New Theory of Economic Policy," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 61(2-3), pages 135-150.
More about this item
KeywordsLQ-policy games; policy ineffectiveness; static controllability;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2005-04-30 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2005-04-30 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MAC-2005-04-30 (Macroeconomics)
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