Wage Formation in Open Economies and the Role of Monetary and Wage-Setting Institutions
The paper studies the determinants of unemployment in a two-countrymodel, where real wages are the outcome of the strategic interaction between various institutional players (firms, unions, central banks). We show that: (i) the results derived in the recent literature on this topic are not generally robust against the introduction of openness; (ii) the shape of the Calmfors-Driffill curve not only depends on a country's own centralization of wage bargaining (CWB) but rather on home and foreign characteristics; (iii) the model challenges the established belief that a shift to a monetary union (MU) will (negatively) affect unemployment in all member countries by fundamentally changing the nature of strategic interactions. Under certain assumptions our open-economy model suggests that the formation of a MU has no effect whatsoever on structural unemployment.
|Date of creation:||04 Jun 2003|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, Rm E35, The Bute Building, Westburn Lane, St Andrews, KY16 9TS, UK|
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/society/annualconf.asp
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:ac2003:124. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.