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Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games

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  • di Bartolomeo, Giovanni
  • Acocella, Nicola

Abstract

This paper generalizes the classical theory of economic policy to a static LQ-strategic context between n players. We show how this generalized version of controllability can profitably be used to deal with policy ineffectiveness issues and Nash equilibrium existence.

Suggested Citation

  • di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Acocella, Nicola, 2005. "Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games," Economic Theory and Applications Working Papers 12178, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemet:12178
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.12178
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    2. N. Acocella & G. Bartolomeo & Andrew Hallett, 2006. "Controllability in Policy Games: Policy Neutrality and the Theory of Economic Policy Revisited," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 28(2), pages 91-112, September.
    3. Nicola Acocella, 2022. "Rediscovering Economic Policy in Europe?," Review of Economics and Institutions, Università di Perugia, vol. 13(1-2).
    4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Non-neutrality of economic policy: An application of the Tinbergen-Theil’s approach to a strategic context," Macroeconomics 0504035, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 26 Apr 2005.
    5. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2007. "Towards a new theory of economic policy: Continuity and innovation," MPRA Paper 4419, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2013. "Target Controllability and Time Consistency: Complement to the Tinbergen Rule," Working papers 2013-35, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    7. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2008. "When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability," CEPR Discussion Papers 7078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Nicola acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Andrew Hughes Hallett, "undated". "The theory of economic policy: from a theory of control to a theory of conflict (resolutions)," Working Papers 91/11, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e Modelli per l'Economia, il Territorio e la Finanza MEMOTEF.
    9. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola, 2013. "When Can Policy Makers Anchor Expectations? Dynamic controllability and the limits to time inconsistency," wp.comunite 0104, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    10. Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Piacquadio, Paolo G., 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 303-305, December.
    11. Pauline Barrieu & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2009. "Economic Policy when Models Disagree," CIRANO Working Papers 2009s-03, CIRANO.
    12. Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Acocella, Nicola, 2011. "Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 113(1), pages 32-34, October.
    13. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2008. "The Emerging New Theory of Economic Policy," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 61(2-3), pages 135-150.
    14. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2010. "Conflict of interest and coordination in public good provision," Politica economica, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 3, pages 389-408.
    15. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2011. "The Optimality And Controllability Of Monetary Policy Through Delegation With Consistent Targets," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(1), pages 82-106, February.
    16. Canofari, Paolo & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Messori, Marcello, 2021. "“Whatever it takes”: A plea for active monetary policies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    17. Hallett, Andrew Hughes & Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2010. "Policy games, policy neutrality and Tinbergen controllability under rational expectations," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 55-67, March.
    18. Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni, 2012. "Expectations Dynamics: Policy, Announcements and Limits to Dynamic Inconsistency," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-25, April.
    19. Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller, 2011. "The Optimality and Controllability of Discretionary Monetary Policy," Working papers 2011-17, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    20. Pauline Barrieu & Sinclair Desgagn�, 2009. "Economic policy when models disagree," GRI Working Papers 4, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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