Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games
We study the relationship between equilibrium existence and uniqueness in LQ-games, and the classical theory of economic policy. By focusing on system controllability, we find necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium that generalize results in the existing literature.
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- Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Acocella Nicola & Hughes Hallett Andrew, 2008. "The existence of Nash equilibria in n-player LQ-games, with applications to international monetary and trade agreements," wp.comunite 0040, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Partha Dasgupta & Eric Maskin, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26.
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Piacquadio, Paolo G., 2009.
"Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games,"
Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 303-305, December.
- ACOCELLA, Nicola & DI BARTOLOMEO, Diovanni & PIACQUADIO, Paolo G., "undated". "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," CORE Discussion Papers RP 2236, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Acocella Nicola & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Piacquadio Paolo Giovanni, 2009. "Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games," wp.comunite 0054, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
- Pappa, Evi, 2004. "Do the ECB and the fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 753-779, May.
- Evi Pappa, 2004. "Do the ECB and the Fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Acocella, N. & Di Bartolomeo, G., 2006. "Tinbergen and Theil meet Nash: Controllability in policy games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 213-218, February.
- Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Nicola Acocella, 2005. "Tinbergen and Theil Meet Nash: Controllability in Policy Games," Working Papers 2005.132, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2005. "Tinbergen And Theil Meet Nash: Controllability In Policy Games," Macroeconomics 0504036, EconWPA, revised 06 Sep 2005.
- Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2001. "Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdependence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 116(2), pages 421-445.
- Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 1997. "Welfare and Macroeconomic Interdependence," NBER Working Papers 6307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hamada, Koichi, 1976. "A Strategic Analysis of Monetary Interdependence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(4), pages 677-700, August. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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