Tinbergen controllability and n-player LQ-games
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References listed on IDEAS
- Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Piacquadio, Paolo G., 2009.
"Conflict of interests, (implicit) coalitions and Nash policy games,"
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- Nicola acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo & Andrew Hughes Hallett, "undated". "The theory of economic policy: from a theory of control to a theory of conflict (resolutions)," Working Papers 91/11, Sapienza University of Rome, Metodi e modelli per l'economia, il territorio e la finanza MEMOTEF.
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KeywordsPolicy games Equilibrium existence Decentralization Centralization;
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