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Common Currencies versus Monetary Independence

  • Cooley, Thomas F
  • Quadrini, Vincenzo

We study the optimal monetary policy in a two-country open-economy model under two monetary arrangements: (a) multiple currencies controlled by independent policy-makers; (b) common currencies controlled by a centralized policy-maker. Our findings suggest that: (i) Monetary policy competition leads to higher long-term inflation and interest rates with large welfare losses; (ii) The inflation bias and the consequent losses are larger when countries are unable to commit to future policies; (iii) in both cases, the welfare losses from higher in ation dominates the welfare costs of losing the ability to react optimally to business cycle shocks. Therefore, the coordination of policies implicit in the adoption of a common currency or dollarization has positive welfare consequences.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 3436.

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Date of creation: Jun 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3436
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  1. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1995. "Double-edged incentives: Institutions and policy coordination," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 38, pages 1973-2030 Elsevier.
  2. Obstfeld, Maurice & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1995. "Exchange Rate Dynamics Redux," CEPR Discussion Papers 1131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Barro, Robert & Alesina, Alberto, 2002. "Currency Unions," Scholarly Articles 4551795, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  4. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 1999. "New Directions for Stochastic Open Economy Models," NBER Working Papers 7313, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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  13. Evi Pappa, 2004. "Do the ECB and the Fed really need to cooperate? Optimal monetary policy in a two-country world," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 512, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  14. David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1992. "Dynamics of the trade balance and the terms of trade: the S-curve," Working Paper 9211, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  15. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo, 2002. "International Dimensions of Optimal Monetary Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 3349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Matthew B. Canzoneri & Robert E. Cumby & Behzad T. Diba, 2002. "The Need for International Policy Coordination: What's Old, What's New, What's Yet to Come?," NBER Working Papers 8765, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Reinert, Kenneth A. & Roland-Holst, David W., 1992. "Armington elasticities for United States manufacturing sectors," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 631-639, October.
  18. Corsetti, Giancarlo & Pesenti, Paolo & Roubini, Nouriel & Tille, Cedric, 2000. "Competitive devaluations: toward a welfare-based approach," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 217-241, June.
  19. Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, 2000. "Do We Really Need a New International Monetary Compact?," NBER Working Papers 7864, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Lucas, Robert Jr., 1990. "Liquidity and interest rates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 237-264, April.
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