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A Note on the Anchoring Effect of Explicit Inflation Targets

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  • Jan Libich

Abstract

Empirical literature provided convincing evidence that explicit (ie legislated) inflation targets anchor expectations. We propose a novel game theoretic framework with generalized timing that allows us to formally capture this beneficial anchoring effect. Using the framework we identify several factors that in?uence whether and how strongly expectations are anchored, namely: (i) the public?s cost of decision-making, (ii) the public?s inflation aversion, (iii) the slope of the Phillips curve, (iv) the magnitude of supply shocks, (v) the degree of central bank conservatism, and under many (but not all) circumstances, (vi) the explicitness of the inflation target.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Libich, 2009. "A Note on the Anchoring Effect of Explicit Inflation Targets," CAMA Working Papers 2009-21, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    • Handle: RePEc:een:camaaa:2009-21
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    12. Libich, Jan, 2008. "An explicit inflation target as a commitment device," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 43-68, March.
    13. Levin, Andrew & Gürkaynak, Refet & Swanson, Eric T., 2006. "Does Inflation Targeting Anchor Long-Run Inflation Expectations? Evidence from Long-Term Bond Yields in the US, UK and Sweden," CEPR Discussion Papers 5808, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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    16. Meredith J. Beechey & Benjamin K. Johannsen & Andrew T. Levin, 2011. "Are Long-Run Inflation Expectations Anchored More Firmly in the Euro Area Than in the United States?," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(2), pages 104-129, April.
    17. Refet S. Gürkaynak & Brian Sack & Eric Swanson, 2005. "The Sensitivity of Long-Term Interest Rates to Economic News: Evidence and Implications for Macroeconomic Models," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 425-436, March.
    18. Jan Libich & Petr Stehlík, 2012. "Monetary Policy Facing Fiscal Indiscipline under Generalized Timing of Actions," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 168(3), pages 393-431, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Acocella, Nicola & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni, 2008. "When Can Central Banks Anchor Expectations? Policy communication and controllability," CEPR Discussion Papers 7078, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Hughes Hallett Andrew & Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Acocella Nicola, 2013. "Central banks and economic policy after the crisis: What have we learned?," wp.comunite 0106, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    3. Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2010. "Incorporating rigidity and commitment in the timing structure of macroeconomic games," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 767-781, May.
    4. Hughes Hallett, Andrew & Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni & Acocella, Nicola, 2012. "A general theory of controllability and expectations anchoring for small-open economies," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 397-411.
    5. Libich Jan, 2011. "Inflation Nutters? Modelling the Flexibility of Inflation Targeting," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-36, June.
    6. Di Bartolomeo Giovanni & Hughes Hallett Andrew & Acocella Nicola, 2013. "When Can Policy Makers Anchor Expectations? Dynamic controllability and the limits to time inconsistency," wp.comunite 0104, Department of Communication, University of Teramo.
    7. Libich, Jan & Stehlík, Petr, 2011. "Endogenous monetary commitment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 103-106, July.
    8. Andrew Hallett & Jan Libich, 2012. "Explicit inflation targets and central bank independence: friends or foes?," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 45(4), pages 271-297, November.
    9. Dat Thanh Nguyen & Viet Anh Hoang, 2020. "Monetary Consequences of Fiscal Stress in a Game Theoretic Framework," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 9(special i), pages 125-164.

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    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • E63 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Comparative or Joint Analysis of Fiscal and Monetary Policy; Stabilization; Treasury Policy

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