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Imperfect Transparency and Shifts in the Central Bank's Output Gap Target

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Abstract

In the New Keynesian framework, the public's expectation about the future path of monetary policy is an important determinant of current economic conditions. This paper examines the impact of unobservable shifts in the central bank's output gap target on inflation and output dynamics. I show that when the degree of persistence of a shock is private information of the central bank, and policy is discretionary in nature, it is optimal for the central bank not to reveal the future expected path of the output gap target. Perfect transparency unambiguously increases inflation and output volatility and thus lowers welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Niklas J. Westelius, 2006. "Imperfect Transparency and Shifts in the Central Bank's Output Gap Target," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 415, Hunter College Department of Economics, revised 2008.
  • Handle: RePEc:htr:hcecon:415
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    Cited by:

    1. Hefeker, Carsten & Zimmer, Blandine, 2011. "The optimal choice of central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 33(4), pages 595-606.
    2. Francesco Cendron & Gianfranco Tusset, 2014. "Central BanksÕ Transparency: Words as Signals," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0178, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    3. Christoph S. Weber, 2018. "Central bank transparency and inflation (volatility) – new evidence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 21-67, January.
    4. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2015. "Optimal Conservatism and Collective Monetary Policymaking under Uncertainty," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 259-278, April.
    5. Elmar Mertens, 2016. "Managing Beliefs about Monetary Policy under Discretion," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 48(4), pages 661-698, June.
    6. Carsten Hefeker & Blandine Zimmer, 2010. "Central bank independence and conservatism under uncertainty: Substitutes or complements?," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 140-10, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
    7. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2015. "Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 523-545, September.
    8. Rhee, Hyuk Jae & Turdaliev, Nurlan, 2013. "Central bank transparency: Does it matter?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 183-197.
    9. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    10. Meixing Dai, 2016. "Static And Dynamic Effects Of Central Bank Transparency," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 55-78, January.
    11. Hyuk Rhee & Nurlan Turdaliev, 2015. "Central bank policy instrument forecasts," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 10(2), pages 221-245, October.
    12. Meixing Dai & Qiao Zhang, 2017. "Central bank transparency under the cost channel," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(2), pages 189-209, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Transparency; Monetary Policy; Discretion; Commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination

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