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Fiscal policy, institutional quality and central bank transparency

  • Dai, Meixing
  • Sidiropoulos, Moïse
  • Spyromitros, Eleftherios

This paper examines the issues of institutional quality and central bank transparency through the interaction of monetary and fiscal policies. We have found that the effects of transparency and corruption on macroeconomic performance and volatility depend on the relative importance of the marginal supply-side effects of distortionary tax and corruption, the degree of central bank conservativeness and/or the initial degree of opacity about central bank preferences. If the marginal effect of tax is relatively important, more opacity might induce higher level and volatility of inflation when the central bank is sufficiently conservative. Furthermore, opacity and tolerated corruption can mutually reinforce or weaken each other’s effects on the level and volatility of inflation. Transparency is generally a better strategy when the central bank is conservative. However, there could be a case for opacity in order to compensate for the undesirable macroeconomic effects of corruption when the central bank is liberal.

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Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 23766.

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Date of creation: 09 Jul 2010
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:23766
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