Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption with an Intermediary
This note reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition of approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all of the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient," and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrats' bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
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- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2008.
"Petty corruption: A game-theoretic approach,"
International Journal of Economic Theory,
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- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majudar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2008. "Petty Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Working Papers 08-09, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2008. "Petty Corruption A Game Theoretic Approach," Post-Print halshs-00754288, HAL.
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- Roy Radner & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Makul Majumdar, 2004.
"Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats,"
04-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2007. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 351-367, July.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2005. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590706, HAL.
- Leonid Hurwicz, 2008.
"But Who Will Guard the Guardians?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-85, June.
- Hasker, Kevin & Okten, Cagla, 2008. "Intermediaries and corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 103-115, July.
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