Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary
This notes reports part of a larger study of "petty corruption" by government bureaucrats in the process of approving new business projects. Each bureaucrat may demand a bribe as a condition for approval. Entrepreneurs use the services of an intermediary who, for a fee, undertakes to obtain all the required approvals. In a dynamic game model we investigate (1) the multiplicity of equilibria, (2) the equilibria that are "socially efficient", and (3) the equilibria that maximize the total expected bureaucrat's bribe income. We compare these results with those for the case in which entrepreneurs apply directly to the bureaucrats.
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- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majudar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2008.
"Petty Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Approach,"
08-09, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
- Leonid Hurwicz, 2008.
"But Who Will Guard the Guardians?,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-85, June.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2005.
"Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats,"
PSE Working Papers
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2007. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 351-367, July.
- Roy Radner & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Makul Majumdar, 2004. "Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats," Working Papers 04-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Hasker, Kevin & Okten, Cagla, 2008. "Intermediaries and corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 103-115, July.
- repec:cup:cbooks:9780521872751 is not listed on IDEAS
- Güzin Bayar, 2005. "The role of intermediaries in corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 277-298, March.
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