On the Efficiency of 'Single Window'
In many countries, the process of obtaining government approval for different projects involves interaction with multiple government agencies at various levels. This often makes the approval process inefficient by unnecessary lengthening it. In this paper we study the effect of a re-organization of the approval process towards making it a single window clearance system, on the efficiency of the entire process. We have used the expected queue length and the expected waiting time in the system at the stochastic steady state as measures of inefficiency of an approval system.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
|Date of creation:||19 Jan 2009|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||Published in Economic Theory 2010, vol. 43 no. 2, pp. 207-226|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Seung Yoo, 2008. "Petty corruption," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 267-280, November.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majumdar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2007.
"Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats,"
Journal of Development Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 351-367, July.
- Roy Radner & Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Makul Majumdar, 2004. "Strategic Analysis of Petty Corruption: Entrepreneurs and Bureaucrats," Working Papers 04-22, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
- Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2005. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption: Entrepreneurs and bureaucrats," PSE Working Papers halshs-00590706, HAL.
- Lui, Francis T, 1985. "An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 760-81, August.
- Lambert-Mogiliansky, Ariane & Majudar, Mukul & Radner, Roy, 2008.
"Petty Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Approach,"
08-09, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:isu:genres:13020. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Curtis Balmer)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.