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But Who Will Guard the Guardians?


  • Leonid Hurwicz


A pre-recorded version of Leonid Hurwicz' Prize Lecture was presented on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. The lecture was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Leonid Hurwicz, 2008. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-585, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:98:y:2008:i:3:p:577-85 Note: DOI: 10.1257/aer.98.3.577

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Blog mentions

    As found by, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Guarding the guardians
      by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-09-23 18:49:00


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Fikret Adaman & Yahya M. Madra, 2012. "Understanding Neoliberalism as Economization: The Case of the Ecology," Working Papers 2012/04, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    2. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00531464 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. John R. Boyce & David M. Bruner, 2009. "Good Fences Make Good Neighbors: Endogenous Property Rights in a Game of Conflict," Working Papers 09-05, Department of Economics, Appalachian State University.
    4. Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén?
      [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info
      ," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
    5. Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky & Mukul Majumdar & Roy Radner, 2009. "Strategic analysis of petty corruption with an intermediary," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 13(1), pages 45-57, April.
    6. Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011. "Institutional changes: Alternative theories and consequences for institutional design," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 79(1-2), pages 3-19, June.
    7. repec:eee:gamebe:v:105:y:2017:i:c:p:297-315 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. John Boyce & David Bruner, 2012. "Property rights out of anarchy? The Demsetz hypothesis in a game of conflict," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 95-120, June.
    9. Xia, Jun, 2012. "Reprint of: Competition and regulation in China's 3G/4G mobile communications industry—Institutions, governance, and telecom SOEs," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 798-816.
    10. Cabral, Sandro & Lazzarini, Sérgio G., 2010. "Guarding the Guardians: An Analysis of Investigations against Police," Insper Working Papers wpe_202, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    11. Masahiko Aoki, 2013. "Institutions as cognitive media between strategic interactions and individual beliefs," Chapters,in: Comparative Institutional Analysis, chapter 17, pages 298-312 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Reinhard Neck, 2014. "On Austrian Economics and the Economics of Carl Menger," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 42(3), pages 217-227, September.
    13. repec:eee:deveco:v:128:y:2017:i:c:p:49-64 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Eisenbach, Thomas M. & Lucca, David O. & Townsend, Robert M., 2016. "The economics of bank supervision," Staff Reports 769, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, revised 01 Jan 2017.
    15. Martin Shubik, 2011. "The Present and Future of Game Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1808, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    16. Guha, Brishti, 2012. "Who will monitor the monitors? Informal law enforcement and collusion at Champagne," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 83(2), pages 261-277.
    17. Xia, Jun, 2012. "Competition and regulation in China's 3G/4G mobile communications industry—Institutions, governance, and telecom SOEs," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 36(7), pages 503-521.
    18. Jorge Iván González, 2008. "Hurwicz y el juez de última instancia," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 10(19), pages 115-129, July-Dece.
    19. Yahya Madra & Fikret Adaman, 2013. "Neoliberal reason and its forms:Depoliticization through economization," Working Papers 2013/07, Bogazici University, Department of Economics.
    20. Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2017. "Judicial review and the power of the executive and legislative branches," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 67-85.
    21. Gani Aldashev & Giorgio Zanarone, 2014. "Endogenous Enforcement Institutions," Working Papers 1403, University of Namur, Department of Economics.
    22. Smith, Eric & Shubik, Martin, 2011. "Endogenizing the provision of money: Costs of commodity and fiat monies in relation to the value of trade," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(4-5), pages 508-530.
    23. V. N. Kolokoltsov & O. A. Malafeyev, 2017. "Mean-Field-Game Model of Corruption," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 34-47, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact


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