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Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns

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  • Calsamiglia, Xavier

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  • Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:14:y:1977:i:2:p:263-283
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    Cited by:

    1. Calsamiglia, Xavier & Kirman, Alan, 1993. "A Unique Informationally Efficient and Decentralized Mechanism with Fair Outcomes," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1147-1172, September.
    2. Ajit Singh, 2011. "Comparative advantage, industrial policy and the World Bank: back to first principles," Policy Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(4), pages 447-460.
    3. John Ledyard & Charles Noussair & David Porter, 1996. "The allocation of a shared resource within an organization," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 163-192, December.
    4. Antonio Villar, 1994. "Existence and efficiency of equilibrium in economics with increasing returns to scale: an exposition," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 18(2), pages 205-243, May.
    5. Luis Corchon & Simon Wilkie, 1996. "Double implementation of the ratio correspondence by a market mechanism," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 325-337, December.
    6. Takashi Ishikida & Thomas Marschak, 1996. "Mechanisms that efficiently verify the optimality of a proposed action," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 33-68, December.
    7. Tian, Guoqiang, 2004. "On the Informational Requirements of Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Mechanisms in Economies with Increasing Returns," MPRA Paper 41226, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2006.
    8. Kaplan, Todd R. & Wettstein, David, 1999. "Cost sharing: efficiency and implementation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 489-502, December.
    9. Murty, Sushama, 2010. "Externalities and fundamental nonconvexities: A reconciliation of approaches to general equilibrium externality modeling and implications for decentralization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 331-353, January.
    10. Loehman, Edna & Dinar, Ariel, 1992. "Cooperative Technology Solutions to Externality Problems: The Case of Irrigation Water," Working Papers 232418, University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    11. Jordan, J. S. & Xu, Dingbo, 1999. "On the Communication Complexity of Expected-Profit Maximization," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 185-202, June.
    12. Leonid Hurwicz, 2008. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(3), pages 577-585, June.
    13. Leonid Hurwicz, 1994. "Economic design, adjustment processes, mechanisms, and institutions," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 1(1), pages 1-14, December.
    14. Segal, Ilya, 2007. "The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 341-378, September.
    15. Thomas Marschak, 1996. "On economies of scope in communication," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 2(1), pages 1-31, December.
    16. Ilya Segal, 2004. "The Communication Requirements of of Social Choice Rules and Supporting Budget Sets," Economics Working Papers 0039, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    17. Tian, Guoqiang, 2001. "The Unique Informational Effciency of the Lindahl Allocation Process in Economies with Public Goods," MPRA Paper 41229, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2005.
    18. Marschak, Thomas, 2006. "Organization Structure," MPRA Paper 81518, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Tian, Guoqiang, 2009. "Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 526-545, May.
    20. Nisan, Noam & Segal, Ilya, 2006. "The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 129(1), pages 192-224, July.

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