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Cooperative Technology Solutions to Externality Problems: The Case of Irrigation Water

Listed author(s):
  • Loehman, Edna
  • Dinar, Ariel
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    File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/232418
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    Paper provided by University of California, Davis, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics in its series Working Papers with number 232418.

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    Date of creation: 1992
    Handle: RePEc:ags:ucdavw:232418
    Contact details of provider: Phone: 530-752-1517
    Fax: 530-752-5614
    Web page: http://www.agecon.ucdavis.edu/

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    1. Leonid Hurwicz, 1987. "Inventing New Institutions: The Design Perspective," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 69(2), pages 395-402.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    3. Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
    4. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "On the Core of an Economic System with Externalities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(4), pages 678-684, Part I Se.
    5. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.
    6. Dick, Daniel T., 1976. "The voluntary approach to externality problems: A survey of the critics," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 185-195, February.
    7. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1985. "Oil Field Unitization: Contractual Failure in the Presence of Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 368-385, June.
    8. Bergstrom, Theodore C & Cornes, Richard C, 1983. "Independence of Allocative Efficiency from Distribution in the Theory of Public Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(6), pages 1753-1765, November.
    9. Paul A. Samuelson, 1950. "Evaluation Of Real National Income," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(1), pages 1-29.
    10. E. Loehman & A. Whinston, 1974. "An Axiomatic Approach to Cost Allocation for Public Investment," Public Finance Review, , vol. 2(2), pages 236-250, April.
    11. Otto A. Davis & Andrew Whinston, 1962. "Externalities, Welfare, and the Theory of Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 241-241.
    12. Beghin, John C., 1990. "Game-Theoretic Model of Endogenous Public Policies, A," Staff General Research Papers Archive 1573, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    13. Rinaldi, S. & Soncini-Sessa, R. & Whinston, A. B., 1979. "Stable taxation schemes in regional environmental management," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 29-50, March.
    14. Young, H Peyton, 1985. "Producer Incentives in Cost Allocation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 757-765, July.
    15. Dinar, Ariel & Zilberman, David, 1991. "The economics of resource-conservation, pollution-reduction technology selection: The case of irrigation water," Resources and Energy, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 323-348, December.
    16. Starrett, David A., 1972. "Fundamental nonconvexities in the theory of externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 180-199, April.
    17. Lin, Steven A. Y. (ed.), 1976. "Theory and Measurement of Economic Externalities," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 1, number 9780124504509.
    18. Friedman, James W. & Rosenthal, Robert W., 1986. "A positive approach to non-cooperative games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(3), pages 235-251, September.
    19. Rosenthal, Robert W., 1981. "Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 92-100, August.
    20. Polinsky, A. Mitchell, 1980. "The efficiency of paying compensation in the Pigovian solution to externality problems," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 142-148, June.
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