Bargaining Over Public Goods
In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure whose equilibria converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent to the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.
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- Julio Davila & Jan Eeckhout, 2008.
"Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium,"
Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers)
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Levine's Working Paper Archive
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Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
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- Harrington, Joseph Jr., 1989. "The advantageous nature of risk aversion in a three-player bargaining game where acceptance of a proposal requires a simple majority," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 195-200, September.
- Thomson, William, 1999. " Economies with Public Goods: An Elementary Geometric Exposition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 1(1), pages 139-76.
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