Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective
We study collective search processes in which members of a committee decide whether to accept the current proposal or continue searching. The acceptance decision is made according to majority rule. We study which members have more impact on the decision, as well as the degree of randomness of the decision. When proposals vary along a single dimension, the acceptance set is small, and at most two members determine the outcome whatever the majority rule. When proposals vary along many dimensions, the acceptance set is large except under unanimity and all members affect the distribution of decisions. Various implications are drawn. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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